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INTRODUCTION
At first glance, federalism would seem to have fared poorly under the Obama
Administration. The Administration‘s signature achievements to date involve
substantial expansions of the federal government‘s role, be it through new federal
legislation addressing health insurance and financial sector reform or massive
injections of federal spending.1 Such expansions in the federal government‘s role
frequently translate into restrictions on the states. New federal legislation often
preempts prior state regulation, and federal spending often comes with substantial
conditions and burdens for the states. Not surprisingly, many state officials have
sharply criticized these developments at the federal level, often invoking
federalism as their fighting flag.2

* Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. Special thanks to David Barron, Seth Davis, Abbe
Gluck, John McGinnis, Trevor Morrison, and Erin Ryan for their helpful comments and to
Matthew Huppert, Kristin Olson, and Katherine Terrell for excellent research assistance.
1. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of 7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 31,
and 42 U.S.C.); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.); American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009) (to be codified
in scattered sections of 6, 19, 26, 42, and 47 U.S.C.).
2. The most prominent opposition has been lawsuits, brought by over twenty state governors and
attorneys general, to the ACA, alleging that it exceeds Congress‘s commerce, spending, and tax
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Yet the story of federalism‘s fate under the Obama Administration is not
so simple. To be sure, these national developments entail some preemption and
new state burdens. But each also has brought with it significant regulatory and
financial opportunities for the states. States play a pivotal role in implementing
the new federal health insurance legislation, with responsibilities ranging from
creating and operating the health insurance exchanges to overseeing premium rate
increases to running expanded Medicaid programs.3 States also have increased
regulatory responsibilities under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), which takes a notably restrictive
approach to preemption.4 Preemption by federal administrative agencies has been
further curtailed by President Obama‘s Preemption Memorandum, issued early in
his Administration, instructing agencies that preemption ‖should be undertaken
only with full consideration of the legitimate prerogatives of the States and with a
sufficient legal basis for preemption.‖5 Furthermore, a substantial amount of the
stimulus funding went to the states, cushioning the effects of the financial crisis
on state employment and operations and representing the greatest increase in
flexible federal financial aid to the states in thirty years.6

powers and violates the Tenth Amendment. See Second Amended Complaint, Florida ex rel.
McCollum v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D. Fla. 2010)(No.
3:10-CV-00091-RY-CMT) [hereinafter Florida Healthcare Complaint]; Complaint for Declaratory
and Injunctive Relief, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010)
(No. 3:10-CV-00188-HEH) [hereinafter Virginia Health Care Complaint]. Several Republican
governors—most prominently Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, Rick Perry of Texas, and Mark Sanford
of South Carolina—also protested the federal government‘s use of stimulus funds, both generally
and in the context of specific programs such as Race to the Top. See Michael Luo, Jobless Angry
at Possibility of Losing Out on Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2009, at A13 (reporting that nine
Republican governors protested receipt of federal stimulus funds); Letter from Rick Perry, Gov. of
Tex., to Arne Duncan, U.S. Sec‘y of Educ. (Jan. 13, 2010), available at
http://governor.state.tx.us/files/press-office/O-DuncanArne201001130344.pdf (―Texas will not be
submitting an application for RTTT funds.‖).
3. See infra text accompanying notes -, .
4. See infra Part I.B.
5. See Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies Regarding
Preemption, 74 Fed. Reg. 24,693, 24,693 (May 20, 2009) [hereinafter Obama Preemption Memo].
Although more cautious about preemption generally, the Obama Administration has supported
claims of preemption in several contexts. See infra Part I.D.
6. See Tim Conlan & Paul Posner, Inflection Point? Federalism and the Obama Administration 7
(Sept.
2010)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1666204_code1511762.pdf?abstractid=164226
4&mirid=1 (describing how ARRA‘s ―principal initiatives .... were designed in large part to help
cushion state budgets‖ and ―minimize layoffs,‖ and that they ―provided by far the largest amount
of flexible federal aid to state governments since General Revenue Sharing was eliminated in
1980‖); Thomas L. Gais, Federalism During the Obama Administration 6 (May 7, 2010)
(unpublished PowerPoint presentation), available at http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/federalism/201005-07-federalism_during_obama_administration.pdf (describing financial aid to states).
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Rather than assertions of federal power at the expense of the states, the
central dynamic evident under the Obama Administration to date is more active
government, at both the national and state level. States are given significant room
to shape their participation in the new federal initiatives, as well as enhanced
regulatory authority and expanded resources to do so.7 States that are eager to
play a greater regulatory role and support the new federal policies therefore have
much to gain. But states that choose to stay on the sidelines face the prospect of
direct federal intervention or loss of access to substantial federal funds, and their
ability to pursue their preferred regulatory (or deregulatory) strategies may be
curtailed.8 Put differently, federalism under the Obama Administration is
federalism in service of progressive policy, not a general devolution of power and
resources to the states.9 Some might dispute that granting states a role to play in
advancing a policy agenda emanating from Washington represents federalism at
all.10 At a minimum, the Obama Administration experience puts front and center
the debate over whether federalism has any principled, apolitical basis or is
instead simply invoked when it serves to advance a favored political result.11 Yet
this experience also suggests that, even in areas in which the national government
has constitutional authority to set policy and federalism operates at best as a
second-order concern, the result can still be substantial and potentially lasting
protection of state authority.12
Equally significant, the experience so far under the Obama Administration
highlights the central importance of the administrative sphere to modern day
federalism. Critical decisions about the actual scope of state powers and
autonomy will be made not in Congress or in the courts, but in the halls of
agencies like the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the

7. See infra Part II.A.
8. See infra Part II.A.
9
The Obama Administration‘s affinity with the ―progressive federalism‖ movement was noted
early on. See John Schwartz, Obama Seems to Be Open to A Broader role for the States, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 29, 2009 (describing this movement as one ―in which governors and activist state
attorneys general have been trying to lead the way on environmental initiatives, consumer
protection, and other issues.‖); see generally Symposium, Progressive Federalism, 3 harv. L. &
Pol‘y Rev. 1 (2009).
10. See infra text accompanying notes -81.
11. For arguments that federalism does not have an apolitical basis, see Frank B. Cross, Realism
About Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1304, 1307 (1999) (―[F]ederalism is consistently (and I
contend inherently) employed only derivatively, as a tool to achieve some other ideological end.‖);
Neal Devins, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 131, 137 (2004) (―Elected
officials invoke federalism when it comports with their substantive policy preferences, but they
otherwise do not care about the federal-state balance.‖); see also Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm
Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 914 (1994)
(―[M]any standard arguments advanced for federalism are clearly nothing more than policy
arguments for decentralization.‖).
12. See infra text accompanying notes -90.
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Department of Education.13 True, federal administrative agencies have long had
substantial power over the shape of nation-state relationships, but the recent
regulatory developments expand that power considerably.14 Indications so far
suggest that federal agencies have pulled back from more aggressive preemption
practices and are allowing states to exercise genuine implementation discretion—
indeed at times actively soliciting state partnerships.15
A particularly interesting feature of the Obama Administration initiatives,
moreover, is their use of administrative structures that not only deeply embed the
states in federal program implementation but also give the states a role in setting
the content of federal regulatory standards and even overseeing federal agency
performance.16 These structures raise the question of how institutional design can
be used to foster greater administrative attentiveness to federalism concerns, as
well as underscore the role states can play in reforming federal agencies. 17 These
structures also highlight the important role that administrative law can play in
supplementing political and administrative checks on federal overreaching.18
In Part I of what follows, I begin by describing three major legislative
initiatives under the Obama Administration that have substantial federalism
implications: the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Dodd-Frank, and
the federal stimulus (officially known as American Reinvestment and Recovery
Act), with particular focus on the use of stimulus funds in the Department of
Education‘s Race to the Top program. I also describe significant moves the
Administration has made on the preemption front, both restricting and supporting
preemption claims. In Part II, I turn to assessing the implications of these
developments for federalism, emphasizing both the central pro-regulatory
dynamic and the critical importance of administrative federalism.
I. FOUR FEDERALISM DEVELOPMENTS
The most notable federalism developments under the Obama
Administration have occurred largely in the legislative sphere. This Part offers a
description of three major pieces of legislation—the health insurance and
financial sector reform measures and the Recovery Act—that are particularly
significant from a federalism perspective. It also details related administrative
developments that have had substantial impact on the states, including the
Department of Education‘s Race to the Top program and the Administration‘s
position on preemption.
13. See infra Part II.B.
14. See infra text accompanying notes -98.
15. See infra Part II. B.
16. See infra text accompanying notes -98, -12.
17. See infra text accompanying notes -09.
18. See infra text accompanying notes -12.
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A. The Affordable Care Act and Health Insurance Reform
Perhaps the signal achievement of the Obama Administration to date is the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, known as the Affordable
Care Act or ACA for short.19 ACA undertakes a major overhaul of health
insurance, imposing substantial new federal requirements and expanding health
insurance to 32 million of the nation‘s 55 million uninsured.20 Critical features of
the legislation include: prohibitions on insurance companies discriminating
against individuals based on preexisting conditions or imposing caps on
benefits;21 a requirement that individuals purchase insurance along with premium
subsidies for those below certain income thresholds;22 regulation of insurance
premium increases and the amount insurance companies spend on non-medically
related expenses;23 expansion of Medicaid to cover all individuals under 133
percent of the poverty line;24 extension of children‘s eligibility for insurance
under their parents until the age of 26;25 and the creation of new health exchanges
that the states will run.26 Of these, the requirement that individuals obtain a
minimum level of health insurance has generated the most attention and attack.
Based on health insurance reforms adopted by Massachusetts in 2006, this
requirement has provoked numerous lawsuits, including one by Virginia and

19. Or as ―ObamaCare‖ by conservatives, which though ideologically laden does convey the
measure‘s importance to the Administration. See, e.g., Pam Bondi, Op-Ed., The State Versus
ObamaCare, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2011, at A15.
20. See, e.g., Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Hon. Nancy
Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives 9-10 (Mar. 20, 2010) [hereinafter CBO Pelosi
Letter],
available
at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11379/AmendReconProp.pdf
(estimating ACA‘s effect on insurance coverage).
21. See ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148 sec. 1201, § 2704, 124 Stat. 154–55 (2010) (to be codified at
42 U.S.C. § 300gg) (prohibiting discrimination in coverage for preexisting conditions); id. sec.
1001, § 2711, 124 Stat. at 131 (prohibiting ―lifetime limits‖ and ―unreasonable annual limits‖ on
dollar value of benefits).
22. See id. § 1501, 124 Stat. at 242–49 (to be codified in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.)
(individual mandate); id. §§ 1401–1402, 124 Stat. at 213–24 (tax credits and reduced costsharing).
23. See id. sec. 1201, § 2701, 124 Stat. at 155–56 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 300gg)
(prohibiting discriminatory premium rates); id. sec. 1001, § 2718, 124 Stat. at 136–37 (requiring
insurance companies to spend less than 20–25 percent of premium revenue on ―non-claims
costs‖).
24. See id. § 2001(a)(1)(C), 124 Stat. at 271 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 1396a).
25. See id. sec. 1001, § 2714, 124 Stat. at 132 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-14).
26. See id. §§ 1311–1313, 124 Stat. at 173-85 (to be codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
For more information on health benefit exchanges and their implementation, see generally
ROBERT CAREY, PUB. CONSULTING GRP., HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES: KEY ISSUES FOR
STATE IMPLEMENTATION (2010), available at http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/70388.pdf; THE
HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., EXPLAINING HEALTH CARE REFORM: WHAT ARE HEALTH
INSURANCE EXCHANGES? (2009), available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/7908.pdf.
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another by a group of now twenty-six states filed in Florida, all alleging that the
requirement exceeds the scope of Congress‘s constitutional authority.27
Despite this attention and constitutional federalism focus, the minimum
coverage requirement is not the ACA provision that on its face is of greatest
significance to the states.28 Although it preempts state legislation stipulating that
individuals should not have to obtain insurance,29 the requirement applies to
individuals rather than to the states themselves. Instead, the ACA provisions with
greatest direct impact on the states are the substantial expansion of Medicaid and
the creation of the health exchanges.30 The expansion of those eligible for
Medicaid will add 16 million to the Medicaid rolls.31 Ordinarily, states are
required to pay a substantial part of Medicaid costs, with the federal-matching
percentage varying by state. But the federal government will pay the vast majority
of the costs attributable to ACA‘s expansion of the Medicaid rolls, starting at 100
percent in 2014 and declining to 90 percent in 2020 and subsequent years. 32 The
27. See Florida Health Care Complaint, supra note ; Virginia Health Care Complaint, supra note .
I have argued elsewhere that the mandate is a constitutional exercise of Congress‘s tax, commerce,
and necessary and proper powers. See, e.g., Brief of Constitutional Law Professors as Amici
Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellees, Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, No. 10-2388 (6th
Cir. Jan. 21, 2011) (No. 10-CV-11156); Gillian Metzger, Our Pending National Debate: Is
Healthcare Reform Constitutional?, Remarks at the Hot Topic Panel Discussion for the AALS
Annual Meeting (Jan. 7, 2011), in 62 MERCER L. REV. 633, 633-38(2011).
28
Indeed, the challenge to the requirement individuals must purchase insurance as outside of
Congress‘s enumerated powers appears at base animated by individual liberty concerns. See
Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 2011 WL 2556039 at * 32 (No. 10-2388, June 29, 2011)
(Sutton, J., concurring in the judgment) (suggesting that limitations on Congress‘s power to
compel activities are better rooted in due process); see also Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct.
2355, 2364 (2011) (emphasizing the connection between federalism and individual liberty).
29. As of July 2011, eleven states have adopted such measures, either in anticipation of ACA or in
response to it. See Richard Cauchi, State Legislation and Actions Challenging Certain Health
Reforms,
2011,
NAT‘L
CONFERENCE
OF
STATE
LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=18906#New_laws (last updated July 12, 2011).
30. As employers with more than fifty employees, states must provide qualifying health insurance
to their employees or pay an amount per employee, but that requirement is generally true of
employers of that size and is not specific to the states. See ACA § 1513, 124 Stat. at 253-56 (to be
codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); see also id. § 1511, 124 Stat. at 252 (to be codified at
29 U.S.C. § 218A) (employers of two hundred or more employees must automatically enroll new
employees in health insurance if they offer health insurance to existing employees).
31. See KAISER COMM‘N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., MEDICAID COVERAGE AND SPENDING IN HEALTH REFORM: NATIONAL AND STATE BY
STATE RESULTS FOR ADULTS AT OR BELOW 133% FPL 2 (2010), available at
http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/Medicaid-Coverage-and-Spending-in-Health-ReformNational-and-State-By-State-Results-for-Adults-at-or-Below-133-FPL.pdf; Benjamin D. Sommers
& Arnold M. Epstein, Medicaid Expansion—The Soft Underbelly of Health Care Reform?, 363
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2085, 2085 (2010); CBO Pelosi Letter, supra note , at 9.
32. States that had previously extended coverage to include individuals and families up to 133
percent of the poverty line also get substantial subsidization of their efforts, though slightly less
than those states that had not previously expanded; their rate will be 93 percent in 2014 and will
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federal government‘s covering of these costs represents a significant legislative
victory for the states.33 However, states still face greater administrative costs as
well as eventually 10 percent of new coverage costs. Furthermore, they are
required to maintain their existing Medicaid and Children‘s Health Insurance
Program (CHIP) eligibility and benefit levels as a condition of receiving Medicaid
funding.34 Concerns about these additional costs have led some state legislators to
raise the possibility of leaving Medicaid, and the Florida litigation challenges the
Medicaid expansion as unconstitutionally coercive.35
The health exchanges—formally, American Health Benefit Exchanges—
are a centerpiece of ACA‘s effort to expand access to health insurance.36 The
exchanges are initially aimed at people employed by small businesses or
purchasing insurance individually, with the goal of making insurance more

similarly decline to 90 percent in 2020. See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., Summary of
New Health Reform Law 1-2 (Mar. 26, 2010) [hereinafter KFF Health Law Summary], available
at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8061.pdf; see also THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., FINANCING NEW MEDICAID COVERAGE UNDER HEALTH REFORM: THE ROLE OF THE
FEDERAL
GOV‘T
AND
STATES
1
(2010),
available
at
http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8072.pdf (estimating that, in practice, the federal
government will pay for 96 percent of Medicaid expansion over next ten years). The ACA also
extends the state Children‘s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) and expands the federal
contribution rate by 23 percent in 2015. See ACA § 2101, 124 Stat. at 286-88 (to be codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); KFF Health Law Summary, supra, at 2.
33. John Dinan, State Government Influence in the Congressional Policy Process: The Case of
Health Care Legislation in the 111th Congress 6-8, 16-18, 26-32 (2010) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfra?abstract_id=1643301 (―The clearest and most
significant instance of state officials‘ influence was their success in securing more federal funding
for individuals who were made eligible by the expansion of Medicaid.‖).
34. See ACA §§ 2001(b)(2), 124 Stat. at 275-76 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a), 2101(b)(1),
124 Stat. at 286-87 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 1397ee(d)) (requiring ―maintenance of effort‖ in
Medicaid and CHIP coverage for states to receive federal subsidies); Florida Health Care
Complaint, supra note , ¶ 56 (alleging ACA will cause Florida to incur costs to administer and
implement the Act, including ―hiring and training new staff, creating new information technology
infrastructures, developing an adequate provider base ... and ... many other expenses‖); EVELYNE
BAUMRUCKER & BERNADETTE FERNANDEZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MEMORANDUM REGARDING
VARIATION IN ANALYSES OF ACA‘S FISCAL IMPACT ON STATES 4-7 (Sept. 8, 2010), available at
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/58319559/crs-state-impact-of-PPACA
(summarizing
ACA
provisions with potential state cost implications); see also Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Rhetorical
Federalism: The Value of State-Based Dissent to Federal Health Reform, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV.
111, 137 (2010) (―States also face additional administrative requirements under ACA to coordinate
Medicaid enrollment with other government and private health insurance plans.‖).
35. See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 2011 WL 285683 at *4-*7
(No. 3:10–cv–91–RV/EMT) (N.D. Fla., Jan. 31, 2011) (describing and rejecting this claim) );
Emily Ramshaw, Lawmakers Consider Medicaid Withdrawal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/07/us/politics/07ttmedicaid.html
(reporting
that
Texas
legislators are discussing possibility of withdrawing from Medicaid ―more seriously than ever‖).
36. See, e.g., ACA § 1311, 124 Stat. at 173-81 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031).
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affordable and accessible by grouping together larger groups of enrollees.37 The
Act envisions that states will run the exchanges but provides for the federal
government to operate the exchange in a state if the state fails to do so.38
Alternatively, a group of states can opt to operate a regional exchange, or a state
can choose to operate different exchanges in different parts of the state.39 HHS‘s
proposed regulations also offer states the option of partnering with the federal
government to run the exchange.40 This reliance on state-run exchanges marks a
significant difference between the Senate bill that became ACA and the earlier
House version.41 The latter had assigned primary responsibility for operating a
national uniform exchange to the federal government, with states allowed to opt
in to operate state-based exchanges if they met federal requirements.42 State
officials lobbied strongly for state-based exchanges and for states to retain broad
regulatory authority over insurance.43

37. See, e.g., Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., Initial Guidance to States on Exchanges,
http://www.hhs.gov/ociio/regulations/guidance_to_states_on_exchanges.html (last visited June 29,
2011).
38. See ACA § 1311(b), 124 Stat. at 173-74 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031) (requiring states
to establish health benefit exchanges). If HHS determines by January 1, 2013, that a state has
failed to take necessary steps to create an exchange, HHS must create an exchange itself or
contract with a nonprofit to do so. See id. § 1321(c), 124 Stat. at 186-87 (to be codified at 42
U.S.C. § 18041).
39. See id. § 1311(f)(1), 124 Stat. at 174 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031) (allowing states to
establish ―[r]egional or other interstate exchanges‖); id. § 1333(a), 124 Stat. at 206-07 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18053) (providing for ―health care choice compacts‖ whereby states may
agree to offer ―1 or more qualified health plans ... in the individual markets in all such States‖).
40
See U.S. Dep‘t of Heath & Human Servs., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act;
Establishment of Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans: Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 41866,
41870, 41872 (July 15, 2011) (to be codified at 45 CFR Parts 155 and 156 [Hereinafter, Proposed
Exchange Rule]; see also U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., Newsroom, Affordable Insurance
Exchanges: Choices, Competition and Clout for States at 2-3 (July 11, 2001(factsheet detailing
elements of the proposed exchange rule).
41. See Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. (2009).
42. See id. § 301 (proposing a national health insurance exchange run by the newly created Health
Choices Administration); id. § 308 (proposing optional operation of state-based health insurance
exchanges); see also America‘s Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009, H.R. 3200, 111th Cong.
§§ 201, 208 (2009) (making the same proposals); Dinan, supra note , at 35 (noting that state
officials persuaded lawmakers to allow state-run exchanges ―due largely to congressmembers‘
recognition of state experience and expertise in this area‖).
43. Dinan, supra note , at 9, 12-13, 35; see also Reed Abelson, Proposals Clash on States‘ Roles in
Health Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2010, at B1 (―State regulators, too, argue that their role [in
establishing exchanges] is essential.‖); Abbe R. Gluck, A Federalism Agenda for the Age of
Statutes: Intrastatutory Federalism in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. (forthcoming
2011) (manuscript at 29) (on file with author), (arguing that ―the state/federal implementation
balance ... was the key question that divided the House and Senate versions of the legislation, and
ultimately giving the states the leadership role was the ‗deal breaker‘‖).
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ACA stipulates some features of how the exchanges will function: it
requires exchanges to offer four tiers of insurance plans and a catastrophic plan;44
certify health plans for participation based on federal criteria;45 run call centers
and maintain a website that provides comparative data on plans and a calculator
by which consumers can calculate actual costs;46 determine eligibility for public
support, such as Medicaid and premium subsidies, as well as enroll eligible
individuals;47 and certify if individuals are eligible for exemptions from the
coverage requirement.48 But it also leaves many details about how the exchanges
will operate up to HHS and the states.49 One critical feature in the states‘ control
concerns the form that health plan certification takes. States can use certification
as a mechanism by which to negotiate prices and benefits with insurers, as
Massachusetts currently does; alternatively, following Utah‘s lead, they could
broadly certify any plan providing the minimum benefits required, leaving price
and benefit coverage to be determined by the market. They can also choose an
approach somewhere between these extremes.50 States can also choose the
governance structure the exchange will take, in particular whether to create the
exchange as a governmental agency or as a nonprofit organization.51 States can
apply for funding from HHS to help cover the substantial costs involved in getting
the exchanges operational, but the exchanges are required to be financially selfsustaining by 2015.52
44. See KFF Health Law Summary, supra note , at 5.
45. See ACA § 1311(d)(4)(A), (e), 124 Stat. at 176-79 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031).
46. See id. § 1311 (d)(4)(B)-(C),(G), 124 Stat. at 176-77.
47. See id. § 1311 (d)(4)(F), 124 Stat. at 177.
48. See id. § 1311 (d)(4)(H), 124 Stat. at 177 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031); see generally
id. §§ 1302(b), 1321 (to be codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Planning and
Establishment of State-Level Exchanges, Request for Comments, 75 Fed. Reg. 45,584, 45,585-86
(Aug. 3, 2010) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 170) (outlining statutory requirements of health
exchanges); Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., supra note (providing policy guidance for
implementation of exchanges).
49. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Health Insurance Exchanges and the Affordable Care Act: Key
Policy
Issues,
COMMONWEALTH
FUND,
8,
10,
16,
20,
25-26
(2010),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publication/Fund%20Report/2010/Jul/1426_Jo
st_hlt_insurance_exchanges_ACA.pdf (noting flexibility for states in operating exchanges); Alan
Weil, State Policymakers‘ Priorities for Successful Implementation of Health Reform, BRIEFING
(Nat‘l Acad. for State Health Policy, Portland, Me.), May 2010, at 2 (―States have many choices
with respect to the exchange.‖).
50. See Proposed Exchange Rule, supra note , 76 Fed. Reg. at 41891-92; Robert Pear, Health Care
Overhaul Depends on States‘ Insurance Exchanges, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2010, at A23; see also
U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., Initial Guidance to States on Exchanges,
HEALTHCARE.GOV,
http://www.healthcare.gov/center/regulations/guidance_to_states_on_exchanges.html (last visited
June 30, 2011) (initial HHS guidance indicating states would have discretion in structuring
exchanges).
51. See ACA § 1311(d)(1), 124 Stat. at 176 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031); Proposed
Exchange Rule, supra note , 76 Fed. Reg. at 41872.
52. Id. § 1311(a), (d)(5)(A), 124 Stat. at 173, 178.
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As a result of their control over health exchanges, the states will have
substantial influence over the shape that ACA takes on the ground. States and
state officials play important roles in other respects as well.53 Along with HHS,
state insurance commissioners and the exchanges are charged with enforcing
substantive protections contained in ACA and HHS regulations against insurance
companies, such as prohibitions on discriminating against preexisting conditions
and on unreasonable premium increases.54 In some states, such enforcement may
require changes in state law to ensure that state commissioners are authorized to
enforce federal requirements.55 An organization of state officials, the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), is also assigned significant
responsibilities under the Act. In particular, NAIC determines what expenses
count as medically related for purposes of deciding whether insurers are failing to
spend an adequate amount on health care and, as a result, owe policyholders
rebates.56 HHS is instructed to consult with NAIC and other state stakeholders on
a variety of issues central to ACA‘s implementation and has undertaken weekly

53. See Christopher C. Jennings & Katherine J. Hayes, Health Insurance Reform and the Tensions
of Federalism, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2244, 2244 (2010) (―[States‘] new responsibilities include
securing immediate access to high risk pools for all eligible Americans, implementing an array of
insurance-market reforms on an ongoing basis, and eventually establishing health insurance
exchanges.‖); Alan Weil & Raymond Scheppach, New Roles for States in Health Reform
Implementation, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1178, 1178-79 (2010) (noting states must establish new
Medicaid eligibility rules, modify insurance regulations, and seek grants in implementing health
reform, in addition to operating exchanges); Joanne Kenen, National Reform Meets Politics in the
States, AM. PROSPECT, Sept. 2010, at A11 (describing state roles and different types of state
responses).
54. See, e.g., ACA sec. 1001, § 2718(b), 124 Stat. at 137 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg)
(enforcing rebates for non-claims costs over state-determined percentages); id. sec. 1003, § 2794,
124 Stat. at 139-40 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-94) (requiring state review of premium
increases and reporting on trends); id. § 1311(c), 124 Stat. at 174 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
18031) (requiring certification of health plans).
55. See Letter from Jane Cline, President, Nat‘l Assoc. of Ins. Comm‘rs, to Kathleen Sebelius,
Sec‘y, U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs. (Aug. 5, 2010), available at
http://www.naic.org/documents/index_health_reform_section_letter_kathleensebelius.pdf
(reporting NAIC survey indicating that half of states had the general ability to enforce federal law
and almost all states could hold insurers accountable for compliance with federal requirements by
other means, such as their power to approve insurance forms).
56. See ACA sec. 1001, § 2718(d), 124 Stat. at 137 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18)
(requiring Secretary to define what costs are medically related ―in consultation with the National
Association of Insurance Commissions‖). HHS recently issued an interim final rule largely
deferring to NAIC‘s determinations. See Robert Pear, New Rules Tell Insurers: Spend More on
Care, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2010, at A22 (―The rules generally follow recommendations from the
[NAIC].‖). For the text of the interim final rule, see generally Health Insurance Issuers
Implementing Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) Requirements Under the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 74,864 (Dec. 1, 2010) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 158)
[hereinafter, Medical Loss Ration Interim Rule].
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phone calls open to all the states as well as numerous meetings with state
officials.57
The Act also grants states significant flexibility and freedom to
experiment. Starting in 2017, they can apply for a waiver from many of ACA‘s
requirements, and legislation is pending that would move up the availability of
waivers to 2014.58 ACA preempts state laws only to the extent they prevent
application of ACA‘s requirements, and thus states are free to add additional
protections for consumers.59 States can also choose to require plans to provide
additional benefits beyond the essential health benefits specified by HHS, but if
they do so they must cover the cost of those additional benefits for those
individuals participating in the exchanges.60 How much flexibility the states
actually have in practice will depend to a large degree on HHS, which has
authority to issue regulations on a number of issues of particular importance to the
states—such as requirements that state health exchanges must meet to be deemed
adequate and the content of essential health benefits, which will determine the
amount states must pay to subsidize any additional state mandates.61
States‘ responses to ACA to date have varied tremendously. Most states
are preparing to implement at least some of the Act‘s requirements. A number of

57. See, e.g., ACA § 1321(a)(2), 124 Stat. at 186 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18041); id. §
1333(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 206 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18053); Telephone Interview with Alan
Weil, Exec. Dir., Nat‘l Acad. for State Health Policy (Feb. 4, 2011).
58. See ACA § 1332, 124 Stat. at 203-06 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18052); see also Dep‘t of
Health & Human Servs., Application, Review, and Reporting Process for State Innovation:
Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 13553 (Mar. 14, 2011) (proposed procedures for § 1332 waiver
process). States can also provide ―Basic Health Programs‖ for individuals with incomes between
133 and 200 percent of the poverty level, in lieu of their obtaining health care through an
exchange. See id. § 1331, 124 Stat. at 199-203 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18051); NAT‘L
ASSOC. OF INS. COMM‘RS, PREEMPTION AND STATE FLEXIBILITY IN ACA 2 (2010), available at
http://www.naic.org/documents/index_health_reform_general_preemption_and_state_flex_PPAC
A.pdf [hereinafter NAIC, PREEMPTION]. President Obama recently endorsed a bipartisan bill
currently pending in Congress that would allow waivers to be granted in 2014, but it is not clear
that House Republicans will be willing to amend rather than repeal the law. See Empowering
States to Innovate Act, S. 3958, 111th Cong. § 2 (2010); Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Kevin Sack,
Altering Stand on Health Law, Obama Offers Waiver Option, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2011, at A1.
59. See ACA § 1321(d), 124 Stat. at 187 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18041); NAIC,
PREEMPTION, supra note , at 1 (―If a state already has a requirement that at least meets the federal
standards, or adopts one in the future, then it would retain the authority to enforce it.‖).
60. See ACA § 1323(b)(3), 124 Stat. at 193-94 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18043).
61. See id. § 1302(b), 124 Stat. at 163-65 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18022) (requiring
Secretary to define essential health benefits); id. § 1311(c), 124 Stat. at 174-75 (to be codified at
42 U.S.C. § 18031) (requiring Secretary to set standards for certification of health plans); id. §
1311(d)(3), 124 Stat. at 196 (requiring the states to cover cost of mandated benefits above
essential benefits).
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states have joined the litigation challenging its constitutionality, 62 but many of
those states appear to be simultaneously preparing for implementation.63 States
are most engaged with preparing for the Medicaid expansion, which can start in
2011 but must occur by 2014.64 Some states are also taking a lead on developing
health exchanges and implementing other features of the Act, such as the highrisk insurance pools that have already gone into effect. 65 Others, however, are less
active. Twenty-three states, for example, declined to set up a high-risk pool,
leaving HHS with the task of administering the pool for residents of these states.66
Recently, several states have indicated they will not operate health exchanges, and
by mid 2011 only twelve states have legislation in place authorizing a state
exchange.67 Some others, led by state officials who oppose ACA, are taking a
much slower approach toward implementation and are favoring a more minimalist

62. Or more accurately, a number of state AGs or Governors have brought challenges; in several
states, the AG and Governor disagree on the Act‘s constitutionality and only one official is
participating. See, e.g., Tim Hoover, Ritter Among Dem Governors in Battle over Health Care
Law, DENVER POST, Oct. 16, 2010, at B1 (noting this disagreement in Colorado, Michigan,
Pennsylvania, and Washington); Josh Goodman, Health Care Tests the Independence of Attorneys
General,
GOVERNING
POLITICS
BLOG
(Mar.
25,
2010),
http://www.governing.com/blogs/politics/Health-Care-Tests-the.html (comparing disagreement in
Michigan between pro-lawsuit AG and anti-lawsuit governor with disagreement in Georgia
between pro-lawsuit governor and anti-lawsuit AG).
63. Kenen, supra note , at A15 (―There is an understanding that opposition does not equal no one
getting to work on this.‖ (quoting Alan Weil, Exec. Dir., Nat‘l Acad. for State Health Policy)).
According to HHS, by July 2011 forty-nine states had accepted federal grants to help plan and
operate health exchanges and over half had taken additional implementing action. See HHS,
Newsroom, Affordable Insurance Exchanges: States Are Leading the Way (July 11, 2011),
available at: http://www.healthcare.gov/news/factsheets/exchanges07112011d.html. Although the
Florida district court held the individual mandate unconstitutional and unseverable, and therefore
declared the entire ACA unconstitutional, it stayed that ruling pending appeal. Florida ex rel.
Bondi v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV-EMT, 2011 WL 723117, at
*11 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 3, 2011).
64. See ACA § 2001(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 274 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396) (requiring
expansion by January 1, 2014); id. § 2001(a)(4) (allowing state expansion as early as January 1,
2011).
65. See Walecia Konrad, High-Risk Insurance Pools to Begin Next Month, N.Y. TIMES, June 26,
2010, at B6 (noting thirty states had opted to run high-risk insurance pools); Jessica B.
Mulholland, A National Model?, GOVERNING, Nov. 2010 (noting California‘s pioneering efforts in
establishing its health exchange).
66. Kevin Sack, High-Risk Insurance Pools Are Attracting Far Fewer Takers than Projected, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010, at A19.
67. See Jennifer Haberkorn & Sarah Kliff, Jindal: No Exchange Here-E&C to Move on Med-Mal
Bill-Pro-Reformers: Senior Day-NGA Move on Medicaid Flexibility Task Force, POLITICO (Apr.
7, 2011, 11:28 AM), http://www.politico.com/politicopulse/0311/politicopulse461.html (stating
that Louisiana and Florida definitely do not plan on implementing health insurance exchanges and
that Montana, Georgia, and Alaska are likely to follow suit); Robert Pear, Obama Administration
Rolls Out Standards for Health Insurance Marketplaces, N.Y. Times, July 12, 2011 at A12
(reporting that measures to create exchanges failed in another nine states, based on data from the
National Conference of State Legislatures).
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exchange model.68 By contrast, Vermont recently adopted legislation adopting a
single payer health system.69
B. Dodd-Frank and Financial Sector Reform
States are less critical to direct implementation of financial sector reforms
enacted under Dodd-Frank. The primary focus of Dodd-Frank is on reforming the
structure and authority of federal financial regulators. For example, Dodd-Frank
creates a Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) charged with identifying
and responding to risks to the stability of the nation‘s financial system70 and
provides federal regulators with resolution authority for systematically important
firms in danger of defaulting.71 Yet even in these contexts state officials are given
a role to play. The Secretary of the Treasury chairs the FSOC, which consists of
the chair or leader of the main federal financial agencies, such as the Federal
Reserve, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).72 However, three state officials—a banking
supervisor, an insurance commissioner, and a securities commissioner—are
nonvoting members of the FSOC and must be allowed to participate in its
meetings and deliberations unless a majority of the FSOC votes to exclude them
to safeguard confidential information and the Secretary of Treasury, as chair,
agrees.73
68. Kevin Sack, Republicans Rise to Power, With Enmity for Health Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18,
2010, at A13 (―[I]n the 20 states that will have a unified Republican government, up from only
nine today, Republicans can be expected to embrace a less regulatory and more market-driven
approach.‖); Joe Carlson, Minnesota Work-Around, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Oct. 18, 2010),
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20101018/MAGAZINE/101019978 (chronicling effort
by Minnesota trade associations and state agencies to circumvent Governor Tim Pawlenty‘s
opposition and send comment letter to HHS regarding structure of health exchanges).
69. See David Goodman, Vermont Passes Single Payer Care, World Doesn‘t End, Mother Jones,
May 30, 2011, available at: http://motherjones.com/politics/2011/05/vermont-single-payer-healthcare. For the single payer system to go into effect, HHS will need to grant Vermont a waiver from
the ACA‘s requirements. See id.
70. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1392-98 §§ 111-112 (2010) (to be
codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5321-5322).
71. Id. §§ 203-205, 210, 124 Stat. at 1450-1456, 1460 (to be codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
72. Id. § 111(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 1392-93 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5321).
73. Id. § 111(b)(2)-(3), 124 Stat. at 1393 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5321). The Act leaves the
process of selecting a single representative to serve on the council to the state banking supervisors,
insurance commissioners, and securities commissioners, id., and sets their terms at two years. Id. §
111(c), 124 Stat. at 1393 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5321). A question might arise as to
whether this process of selection raises Appointments Clause problems, but the state officials‘
status as nonvoting members may preclude their being considered either principal or inferior
officers. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing that principal officers must be nominated by
the President and confirmed by the Senate, while Congress may vest appointment of inferior
officers in the President, courts of law, or heads of departments). The Conference of State Bank
Supervisors, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, and the North American
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The states are particularly important in two substantive areas Dodd-Frank
addresses—consumer financial protection and insurance regulation.74 Both of
these are areas of traditional state involvement, with Congress going so far as to
delegate primary responsibility for regulating insurance to the states in the
McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945.75 States have been particularly active on the
consumer protection front in recent years, especially on issues related to mortgage
abuses, and have clashed repeatedly with the OCC over enforcement of state
consumer protection laws against national banks and their subsidiaries.76 Two of
these clashes reached the Supreme Court, with mixed results: in Watters v.
Wachovia Bank, the Court held that the National Bank Act (NBA) preempted
state efforts to undertake oversight of state-chartered subsidiaries of national
banks engaging in real estate lending activities,77 whereas in Cuomo v. Clearing
House Ass‘n it rejected the OCC‘s effort to read the NBA as preempting states‘
efforts to judicially enforce state banking laws against national banks. 78 DoddFrank clearly sides with the states on these issues, enacting provisions codifying

Securities Administrators‘ Association recently chose state representatives to the Council. See
Press Release, Nat‘l Ass‘n of Comm‘rs, State Regulators Announce Choices for the Financial
Stability
Oversight
Council
(Sept.
23,
2010),
available
at
http://www.naic.org/Releases/2010_docs/huff_appointed_fsoc.htm.
74. Dodd-Frank affects other areas of traditional state regulation as well, such as corporate
governance and regulation of credit agencies. Dodd-Frank Act §§ 971-972, 124 Stat. at 1915 (to
be codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see also 2010-2011 Policies for the Jurisdiction of
the
Communications,
NATIONAL
CONFERENCE
OF
STATE
LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?TabID=773&tabs=855,15,690 (last visited July 1, 2011)
(―Corporate governance, securities regulation and enforcement of securities laws are areas where
the federal government and the states traditionally share regulatory authority.‖). Additionally,
states may be significantly affected by federal regulation of the municipal fund industry authorized
by Dodd-Frank, such as new restrictions the SEC has imposed on pay-to-play practices in that
context. See Proposed Rule: Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of
1940, 75 Fed. Reg. 77,052, 77,070 (Dec. 10, 2010).
75. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015.
76. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Cuomo v. Clearing House: The Supreme Court Responds to the
Subprime Financial Crisis, and Delivers a Major Victory for the Dual Banking System and
Consumer Protection, in THE PANIC OF 2008: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
REFORM 295, 307-10 (Lawrence E. Mitchell & Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. eds., 2010) [hereinafter
Wilmarth, Supreme Court Responds] (―Despite these initiatives by the states, the OCC‘s actions
seriously obstructed the states‘ ability to protect consumers from predatory lending practices.‖);
Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending: Unmasking the Deregulatory
Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 70-80 (2005) (describing conflict between states and OCC); see also
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC's Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency's Authority and Present
a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING &
FIN. L. 225 (2004) (detailing broad preemption efforts by the OCC).
77. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 550 U.S. 1, 21 (2007).
78. Cuomo v. Clearing House Assn., 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2721-22 (2009).
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the result in Cuomo and overturning Watters.79 More generally, the Act takes a
restrictive approach toward preemption, providing that only inconsistent state law
is preempted, that state laws offering greater protection to consumers are not
inconsistent for that reason, and requiring that a state consumer financial law be
preempted only if the state law discriminates against national banks or ―prevents
or significantly interferes with the exercise by a national bank of its powers‖ as
determined by a court or by the OCC ―on a case-by-case basis.‖80 In addition, the
OCC may not make a preemption determination unless ―substantial evidence,
made on the record of the proceeding, supports the specific finding regarding ...
preemption,‖ and courts are to assess the thoroughness and consistency of OCC
preemption determinations—as well as other factors the court deems relevant—in
assessing the validity of preemption determinations.81 Although the OCC retains
the power to preempt inconsistent state laws by regulation, these restrictions make
clear that Congress intended to cut back on the OCC‘s preemption authority. 82
Equally significant are Dodd-Frank‘s provisions with respect to the ability
of states to enforce federal consumer protection requirements. Concerns that
prudential financial regulators had repeatedly failed to enforce consumer
protection laws against financial institutions—and that they would continue to do
so, given their prime focus on preserving institutions‘ financial stability and
potential capture by the institutions they regulate—led to calls for creation of an
independent federal regulator focused solely on consumer protection.83 DoddFrank ultimately created the new Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection
(CFPB). The CFPB is located in the Federal Reserve but headed by a Director
79. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub L. No. 111-203, § 1042(a), (d)(1), 124 Stat. at 1376, 2012 (to be
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5552); id. § 1044(a), 124 Stat. at 2014-15 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §
25b) (adding 12 U.S.C. § 5136C(b)(2), (e)).
80. Id. § 1044(b)(1), (3); see also id. § 1041(a), 124 Stat. at 2011-12 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §
5551) (providing that only inconsistent state laws are preempted and greater state consumer
protection does not create inconsistency). This general preemption standard is intended to codify
the preemption standard contained in Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996). See DoddFrank Act, § 1044(b)(1)(B), 124 Stat. at 2014 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5553).
81. Dodd-Frank Act § 1044(a), 124 Stat. at 2014-15 (adding 12 U.S.C. § 5136C(b)(5), (c)).
82. See, e.g., id. § 1044(b)(3)(B), 124 Stat. at 2015 (adding 12 U.S.C. § 5136C(b)(3)(B), which
requires that the OCC consult with, and take account of the views of, the new Federal Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau before preempting state law); id. § 1044(d), 124 Stat. at 2016 (adding
12 U.S.C. § 5136C(d)(1), which requires that the OCC review its preemption determinations at
least every five years).
83. See, e.g., Regulatory Restructuring: Enhancing Consumer Financial Products Regulation:
Hearing Before H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 35 (2009) (statement of Edmund
Mierzwinsky, Consumer Program Director, U.S. Public Interest Research Group) (stating that
consumer groups strongly support proposed Consumer Financial Protection Agency); id. at 51
(statement of Travis Plunkett, Legislative Director, Consumer Federation of America) (―CFA
strongly supports creating a Federal consumer protection agency focused on credit and payment
products because it targets the most significant underlying causes of the massive regulatory
failures that have harmed millions of Americans.‖); id. (statement of Elizabeth Warren, Professor,
Harvard Law School) (proposing new Consumer Financial Protection Agency).
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who has removal and term of office protection and the CFPB is guaranteed a
certain percentage of the Fed‘s budget.84 In addition, the Fed lacks power to
oversee CFPB proceedings or review the CFPB‘s rules and orders; instead, CFPB
regulations can only be stayed or set aside by the FSOC on a two-thirds vote.85
The states, however, are granted some authority to force the CFPB to act: ―The
Bureau shall issue a notice of proposed rulemaking whenever a majority of the
States has enacted a resolution in support of the establishment or modification of
a consumer protection regulation by the Bureau.‖86 Moreover, although the states
are not allowed to enforce the consumer protection provisions of Dodd-Frank
directly against national banks and federal savings associations, they are expressly
granted power to enforce regulations issued by the CFPB and to enforce the Act
against state-chartered entities.87 In addition, Elizabeth Warren, who was charged
with getting the new CFPB up and running, has actively encouraging state
attorneys general to be involved in enforcement88 and President Obama recently
nominated the former Ohio Attorney General as CFPB Director.89
Insurance regulation is another area in which Dodd-Frank preserved an
important state role. During the financial crisis, failure of the insurance giant AIG
and several financial guarantee insurers like Ambac raised questions about
whether insurance regulation should be federalized.90 States lobbied largely
successfully for preservation of their traditional oversight of insurance.91
84

Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. at 1376, 1764 §§ 1011(a),(c) (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 5491); id. § 1017, 124 Stat. at 1975-76 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5497).
85. Id. § 1012(c), 124 Stat. at 1965 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5492); id. § 1023(a), 124 Stat. at
1985 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491.
86. Id. § 1041(c), 124 Stat. at 2011-12 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5551). The Act also specifies
factors that the CFPB is to consider and discuss in deciding whether to adopt such a standard;
requires that if it decides not to adopt a final regulation, it publish that determination in the Federal
Register; and further requires that it notify Congress and the requesting states of its determination.
Id. A report by the National Association of Attorneys General reads the requirement that states
must have ―enacted a resolution‖ as indicating that ―the process is triggered only by official
legislative action from a majority of States‖ and as suggesting ―the states must actually submit a
joint request to the Bureau.‖ NAT‘L ASS‘N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., WALL STREET REFORM AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: SUMMARY FOR ATTORNEYS GENERAL 4 (2010), available at
http://www.naag.org/assets/files/pdf/pubs/wall-street-reform-UB.pdf.
87. Dodd-Frank Act, § 1042, 124 Stat. at 2012-14 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5552).
88. Carter Dougherty, Warren Recruits Dodd-Frank Enforcers from 50 States, BLOOMBERG, Dec.
2, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/print/2010-12-02/elizabeth-warren-recruits-doddfrank-enforcers-from-50-states.html.
89. Binyamin Appelbaum, Former Ohio Attorney General to Head New Consumer Agency, N.Y.
Times, July 18, 2011 at B1.
90. See BAIRD WEBEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41372, THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET
REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: INSURANCE PROVISIONS 1 (2010).
91. See, e.g., Memorandum from Leah Campbell, Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, to Clients 8
(Aug.
26,
2010),
available
at
http://www.willkie.com/files/tbl_s29Publications%5CFileUpload5686%5C3483%5CInsuranceIndustry-Implications-of-Dodd-Frank-Act.pdf (―Determinations of an inconsistency will be
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Although the Act creates a new Federal Insurance Office (FIO) within the Federal
Reserve to monitor the insurance industry and report to Congress on how to
modernize and improve insurance regulation—including whether state regulation
leads to gaps in consumer protection and issues of uniformity—the FIO has very
limited regulatory authority.92 It can preempt state insurance measures that are
inconsistent with international agreements and result in less favorable treatment of
foreign insurers, and it can recommend that the FSOC designate an insurer subject
to regulation as a systemically important nonbank financial company.93 But
Dodd-Frank expressly preserves other state insurance measures and denies both
FIO and the Treasury Department any ―general supervisory or regulatory
authority‖ over insurance.94 The inclusion of a state insurance commissioner and
the Director of FIO as nonvoting members of the FSOC—as well as inclusion of
the other state financial regulatory officials as nonvoting members—represented a
conference compromise between the Senate and House versions of the proposed
bill.95

subject to de novo judicial review, a provision favored by such groups as . . .[NAIC] and the
Property Casualty Insurers Association of America and initially rejected by Senate conferees.―);
Letter from Nat‘l Ass‘n of Ins. Comm‘rs to the Hon. Barney Frank, Chairman, House Fin. Servs.
Comm.
(June
3,
2010),
available
at
http://www.naic.org/documents/testimony_100603_officers_letter_fin_reg_reform.pdf (―We thank
you for working with . . . [NAIC] to include several necessary safeguards to ensure state insurance
supervision is preserved, and not unintentionally undermined, within the framework of the
legislation.‖).
92. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. at 1376, 1580-81, 1585-86 § 502(a) (adding
new subsections 31 U.S.C. § 313 (c), (p)).
93. Id. (adding new subsections 31 U.S.C. § 313(c)(1)(C), (f)).
94. Id. (adding new subsection 31 U.S.C. § 313(k)). Congress‘s choice of the FIO in lieu of a more
powerful Office of National Insurance contained in the Senate version also reflected state
influence. S. 3217, 111th Cong. § 502 (2010) (proposing establishment of Office of National
Insurance). State groups were mixed on the FIO, with the NAIC in particular supporting its
creation and the National Conference of Insurance Legislators opposed. See Letter from Nat‘l
Ass‘n
of
Ins.
Comm‘rs
to
Senators
(Apr.
20,
2010),
available
at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/testimony_100420_rafsa.pdf (―The NAIC strongly urges the
Senate to strike the Office of National Insurance language and replace it with the House-passed
Federal Insurance Office (FIO) language.‖); Letter from Nat‘l Conference of Ins. Legislators to
the Hon. Barney Frank, Chairman, House Fin. Servs. Comm. (Oct. 23, 2009), available at
http://www.ncoil.org/HomePage/2009/10272009October23Letter.pdf (―We continue to disagree
with the necessity for such an office and question its accountability and effectiveness. We believe
that state regulation is successfully guiding insurers through the current economic downturn.‖).
95. As passed by the House on December 11, 2009, the bill included state insurance, banking, and
securities regulators as nonvoting members, as well as the Director of the Federal Insurance
Office. H.R. 4173, 111th Cong., § 1001 111(b)(2) (2009). The version that the Senate introduced,
as well as that which passed on May 20, 2010, as an amendment to H.R. 4173, provided only for
the Director of the Office of Financial Research as a nonvoting member who could not be
excluded from Council meetings. S. 3217, 111th Cong. § 111(b)(2) (2010); H.R. 4173, 111th
Cong. § 111(b)(2) (as amended by the Senate, May 20, 2010). The Senate language formed the
conference base text, but the version reported out of conference contained all three state officials

17

C. The Recovery Act, Fiscal Federalism, and Race to the Top
Despite the substantive regulatory import of ACA and Dodd-Frank, the
measure that has had the greatest impact on the states under the Obama
Administration to date is the Recovery Act, the economic stimulus legislation that
was enacted shortly after President Obama‘s inauguration.96 A little over a third,
or $282 billion, of the $787 billion in stimulus funds went to or through the states,
more than any previous stimulus measure.97 The Recovery Act also included
substantial amounts of local government funding, and many of the funds states
received, such as money for transportation or education assistance, were passed
through to localities.98 These funds proved critical to states and localities facing
huge budget deficits during the recent economic crisis, with $160 billion aimed at
helping states cover health and education costs, the two largest components of
state budgets. In particular, the Recovery Act included additional Medicaid
funding and new State Fiscal Stabilization Funds for education, which together
totaled almost $141 billion.99 The net effect was to increase the federal share of
as nonvoting members, as well as the Directors of the Office of Financial Research and the
Federal Insurance Office. H. R. REP. NO. 111-517, sec. 111(b)(2), at 18 (2010).
96. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (AARA), Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009).
97. U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-199, RECOVERY ACT: OPPORTUNITIES TO
IMPROVE MANAGEMENT AND STRENGTHEN ACCOUNTABILITY OVER STATES‘ AND LOCALITIES‘
USES OF FUNDS 4 (2010) [hereinafter GAO RECOVERY ACT REPORT] (identifying $282 billion of
Recovery Act funds for programs administered by states and localities); see also Gais, supra note ,
at 6-9 (identifying amount as $246 billion and a greater percentage of GDP than any previous
stimulus); Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1, 29-30 (2011) (discussing the
strong state lobbying for stimulus funds).
98. See, e.g., ARRA, div. A, tit. VIII, 123 Stat. at 182 (requiring the state to subgrant funds to
local education agencies for school improvement programs); id. § 807(a)(2), 123 Stat. at 190
(authorizing Secretary of Education to require states to make fast payments to local educational
agencies); id. div. A, tit. XII, 123 Stat. at 206-07 (providing that states must allocate 30 percent of
the amounts they receive in highway funding to localities).
99. See NAT‘L GOVERNORS ASS‘N, STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AMERICAN RECOVERY AND
REINVESTMENT
ACT
4,
app.
A
(Mar.
10,
2009),
available
at
http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/ARRASTATEIMPLEMENTATION.PDF (―States will receive
approximately $87 billion in funding through enhancements of the Federal Medical Assistance
Percentage (FMAP), [and] $53.6 billion through a new State Fiscal Stabilization Fund for
education.‖); Olatunde C. A. Johnson, Stimulus and Civil Rights, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 154, 17279 (2011) (describing different categories of stimulus funding). This funding included $87 billion
in Medicaid funds; $53.6 billion in State Fiscal Stabilization Funds, of which $39.5 billion was for
K-12 education; and an additional $26 billion in Title I and special education funds. See NAT‘L
GOVERNORS ASS‘N, ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT 1 (2009)
[hereinafter NGA, ANALYSIS], available at http://www.nga.org/files/pdf/ARRAANALYSIS.pdf;
NAT‘L GOVERNORS ASS‘N, STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AMERICAN RECOVERY AND
REINVESTMENT ACT 4 app. A (Mar. 10, 2009). An additional $25.6 billion went to fund highway
projects, resulting in the now-common sight of road construction identified by signs as paid for by
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act; $8.76 billion to transit projects; and $8.2 billion
for energy efficiency and weatherization projects. See GAO RECOVERY ACT REPORT, supra note ,
at 56, 79, 100.
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total state budgets significantly, up to 34.7 percent in fiscal 2010 from 26.3
percent in fiscal 2008.100
As significant, the Recovery Act included a substantial amount in flexible
aid to states. According to Timothy Conlan and Paul Posner, the Medicaid and
State Fiscal Stabilization Funds ―provided by far the largest amount in flexible
federal aid to state governments since General Revenue Sharing was eliminated in
1980.‖101 Although states were subject to maintenance of effort (MOE)
requirements for many of these funds, the economic recession resulted in
expanded demand for Medicaid, and the effect of increased federal funding was
thus to free states from having to devote additional resources to meeting this new
demand.102 Similarly, the education funds were aimed at making up shortfalls in
state revenues, and the law provided that the Department of Education could
waive or modify the MOE requirements unless the state reduced the proportion of
total state revenues going to K-12 education.103 The Act contained immediate
obligation demands, with states required to use it or lose it.104 It also imposed
extensive transparency and accountability requirements on fund recipients, with
monitoring by a new Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board, the
Government Accountability Office, and agency inspectors general. 105 Eager to
encourage quick spending of stimulus funds, top Administration officials
undertook unusual efforts to assist the states with administrative issues. Office of
100. NGA & NAT‘L ASS‘N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, THE FISCAL SURVEY OF STATES viii
(2010), available at http://nasbo.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=C6q1M3kxaEY%3D&tabid=83.
States stand to gain substantial additional funding through other initiatives, such as the
Affordability Act, Medicaid expansion, and CHIP reauthorization. See Gais, supra note , at 10.
101. Conlan & Posner, supra note , at 7. On Medicaid MOE and other requirements, see NGA,
ANALYSIS, supra note , at 15-16. But see Gais, supra note , at 11 (noting that ARRA funds came
with strings attached, including an expectation to use the funds in ways ―agreeable to Congress
and the Administration‖).
102. Conlan & Posner, supra note , at 7 (―FMAP funding was particularly flexible. The principal
rationale was to assist states with their growing Medicaid caseloads, which expand during
recessions as unemployed workers and their dependents become eligible for benefits. By
precluding the need for states to redirect resources from elsewhere in their budgets in order to
meet their Medicaid obligations, FMAP freed up state resources for other needs.‖). But see Alan
Greenblatt, Federalism in the Age of Obama, State Legislatures July/August 2010, at 27-28
(arguing that MOE requirements for Medicaid and education funds substantially limited state
governments).
103. See NGA, ANALYSIS, supra note , at 2 (explaining that ―The Secretary may waive or modify
any requirement related to maintaining fiscal effort for a state or school district ... The Secretary
may not approve a waiver for a state or school district that decreases the proportionate share of
total revenue that is available to elementary and secondary education.‖); see also Conlan &
Posner, supra note , at 8 (noting MOE requirements and the need for many states to seek
clarification and waivers).
104. See, e.g. ARRA, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 206 (2009).
105. See id. § 1512, 123 Stat. 115 (2009) (guaranteeing GAO involvement and instituting
inspector general reviews); id. §§ 1521-1530 (establishing the Recovery Accountability and
Transparency Board); see also Conlan & Posner, supra note , at 9.
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Management and Budget (OMB) officials conducted weekly conference calls
with representatives of state and local government associations, and Vice
President Biden‘s office assumed responsibility for resolving intergovernmental
conflicts.106
Much of these Recovery Act funds were allocated based on existing
formulas and thus available to all states, with some adjustment to take into
account those states that were particularly hard hit by the recession. 107 Yet some
funds were instead allocated competitively based on state applications, with the
goal of encouraging greater innovation in line with the Administration‘s policy
priorities. Perhaps the most notable of these efforts, and one that had a dramatic
impact on the states, was the Department of Education‘s Race to the Top
program. Race to the Top was a competitive grant program involving $4.35
billion in Recovery Act funds, aimed at encouraging states to improve K-12
education in four core areas: teacher effectiveness and equity in teacher
distribution, data systems, standards and student assessment, and lowestperforming schools.108 Under the program, states submitted applications that were
scored by outside experts and then ranked, with only a certain number of topranked applications receiving funding. Points were awarded for specific state
measures, and states were not eligible to receive a grant if they prohibited linking
student performance data to teacher and principal assessment.109 Recognizing the
central role that local education agencies play, a high priority was put on ensuring
that local agencies were committed to the states‘ proposed reforms.110
The net effect of Race to the Top was to spur significant changes in state
education laws across the country, with numerous states overhauling teacher
evaluation methods, lifting limits on charter schools, and adopting common
106. Conlan & Posner, supra note , at 9.
107. See id. at 8 (noting the Recovery Act‘s reliance on established federal aid programs as a
means of efficient distribution); NGA, ANALYSIS, supra note , at 14-15 (noting the extent that
Medicaid funds are tied in part to state unemployment rates). In the case of the Act‘s education
funding, for example, $39.5 billion of the $53.6 billion provided in State Fiscal Stabilization
Funds was distributed through existing state and federal formulas. See ARRA, Pub. L. No. 111-5,
§ 14002, 123 Stat. at 279-281; NGA, ANALYSIS, supra note , at 1.
108. These four areas were also central to the State Fiscal Stabilization Fund‘s $48.6 billion in
formula grants, with states being required to provide assurances that they would adopt reforms in
these areas and distribution of the final third of these grants to states contingent on states
providing publicly available data on their progress in these areas. See State Fiscal Stabilization
Program, 74 Fed. Reg. 37,837, 37,837-41 (July 29, 2009); Johnson, supra note , at 178-79.
109. See U.S. DEP‘T OF EDUC., RACE TO THE TOP PROGRAM EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2-4 (2009),
available at http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf.
110. See id. at 4 (identifying LEA participation and commitment as an absolute priority for grant
awards); see also Sam Dillon, States Skeptical About ‗Race to Top‘ School Aid Contest, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 5, 2010, at A1 (―Officials from several states criticized the scoring of the contest,
which favored states able to gain support from 100 percent of school districts and local teachers‘
unions.‖).
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standards developed by the National Governors Association and the Council of
Chief State School Officers.111 The program spurred some controversy: in
addition to teacher union protests, some states complained that the program
intruded too far on state control of education policy and was stacked in favor of
more urban eastern states, and civil rights groups complained that a minimal
amount of Race to the Top funds went to minority children.112 Nonetheless, the
Administration views Race to the Top as a substantial success and has proposed
both continuing the program for school districts and using components of it as a
model for reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
(ESEA), better known today as No Child Left Behind.113
A particularly interesting feature of Race to the Top is the extent to which
the requirements for grant awards, and thus the instigation for state policy
changes, were developed in the executive branch. The Recovery Act reserved $5
billion for competitive grants and an innovation fund and further stipulated four
core areas for improvement.114 But the Act left the specifics of how funds were
allotted to the Secretary of Education‘s discretion, with the Secretary expressly
allowed to assess applications based on ―such other criteria as the Secretary
111. See Stephanie Banchero & Neil King, Jr., Nine States, D.C. Win Race for Aid to Schools,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 2010, at A2; Sam Dillon, States Create a Flood of Education Bills, N.Y.
TIMES, June 1, 2010, at A14. But see Stephanie Banchero, Race to the Top Leaves Some School
Reformers Weary, WALL ST. J., June 1, 2010, at A6 (reporting complaints by some school
reformers that changes spurred by Race to the Top were not that significant).
112. See LAWYERS COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW ET AL., FRAMEWORK FOR PROVIDING
ALL STUDENTS AN OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN THROUGH REAUTHORIZATION OF THE ELEMENTARY
AND
SECONDARY
SCHOOL
ACT
4
(2010),
available
at
http://naacpldf.org/files/case_issue/Framework%20for%20Providing%20All%20Students%20an%
20Opportunity%20to%20Learn%202.pdf (recommending that ESEA changes should include
incentives for all states over only a few); Dillon, supra note , at A14 (reporting state intrusion
complaints from Texas, Alaska, and Kansas, which refused to compete for grants); Sam Dillon,
Eastern States Dominate in Winning School Grants, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2010, at A3 (noting that
other than Hawaii, all of the twelve grant winners were states located east of the Mississippi
River); Gerry Shih, Educators are Opposed to Obama‘s School Plan, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2010, at
A27B (reporting on opposition to provisions in Race to the Top from the California Teachers
Union and some California education officials).
113. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES
GOVERNMENT,
FISCAL
YEAR
2012,
67
(2011),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2012/assets/budget.pdf; U.S. DEP‘T
OF EDUC., A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM: THE REAUTHORIZATION OF THE ELEMENTARY AND
SECONDARY
EDUCATION
ACT
6
(2010),
available
at
http://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/leg/blueprint/blueprint.pdf (detailing new federal goals of the
ESEA, including building on Race to the Top‘s success); see also Arne Duncan, U.S. Sec‘y of
Educ., Remarks at the National Press Club (July 27, 2010) available at
http://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/quiet-revolution-secretary-arne-duncans-remarks-nationalpress-club (describing failures of NCLB and detailing new innovation under the new
administration).
114. See ARRA, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §§ 14001(c), 14005(c), 14006-14007, 123 Stat. 115, 279,
282-84 (2009).
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determines appropriate, which may include a State‘s need for assistance.‖ 115 As a
result, the Department of Education established the particular emphases of the
program, which lead to many of the changes in state education laws116 and
reflected education policy goals of the Obama Administration.117 Such executive
branch discretion is a predictable result of greater reliance on project or
competitive grants to the states over formula grants.118 Despite the dominance of
formula funding in the Recovery Act, increased reliance on competitive and
project grants is a notable characteristic of state funding under the Obama
Administration—including much of ACA‘s non-Medicaid state grants and the
proposed ESEA Reauthorization in addition to Race to the Top.119
Another notable characteristic—true not just of Race to the Top but also of
the Recovery Act generally—is the extent to which these programs break open
state governments. President Obama‘s proposed budget recently highlighted Race
to the Top‘s emphasis on localities by including $900 million in Race to the Top
funds for local school districts rather than states. This change would allow
districts like Houston to apply for grants notwithstanding the refusal of their states
to do so.120 The Recovery Act similarly targeted localities, at times requiring that
certain funds be granted to local governments.121 Even more striking, however,
was the Act‘s bypass provision, which authorizes state legislatures to overrule
governors‘ decisions to reject stimulus funds.122 To be sure, federal-local
115. Id. § 14006(b), 123 Stat. at 283.
116. These emphases included the requirement that states were not eligible for Race to the Top
funds if they had prohibited linking student performance data to teacher and principal assessment
and the assignment of a large number of available points to states adopting common standards,
fostering charter schools, and reforming teacher and principal evaluation and tenure systems. See
Race to the Top Fund, 74 Fed. Reg. 59,688, 56,989-91 (Nov. 18, 2009); U.S. Dep‘t of Educ.,
supra note , at 7, 9, 11.
117. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Education Reform at the National
Urban
League
Centennial
Conference
(July
29,
2010),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-education-reform-national-urbanleague-centennial-conference (terming Race to the Top the ―most important thing‖ his
administration had done).
118. See Paul Manna, Education Stimulus Watch, Competitive Grant Making and Education
Reform: Assessing Race to the Top‘s Current Impact and Future Prospects 4-5 (Am. Enter. Inst.,
Working Paper No. 5, 2010).
119. See Gais, supra note , at 12-13, 15; see also Johnson, supra note , at 176 & n.100 (detailing
competitive and formula funds available under the Recovery Act for public housing authorities
and the Administration‘s changes in competitive grant criteria to respond to complaints).
120. Sam Dillon & Tamar Lewin, Obama Budget Raises School Spending and Keeps Pell Grant
Maximum, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2011, at A19; see supra text accompanying note .
121. See supra note and accompanying text. A prime example of this is the Recovery Act
provision that provided the basis for Race to the Top, which required that 50 percent of funds go
to local school districts. See ARRA, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 14006(c), 123 Stat. 115, 284 (2009).
122. AARA § 1607(b), 123 Stat. at 303. Two states appear to have overridden their governors‘
refusal to accept stimulus funds: South Carolina and Alaska. See Edwards v. State, 678 S.E.2d
412, 419-20 (S.C. 2009); Sean Cockerham, Legislature overrides Palin‘s Stimulus Veto,
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interactions are quite common, and localities play a central role in many federal
programs in areas as diverse as homeland security, transportation, and
environmental protection as well as education.123 Yet instances of the federal
government authorizing localities or other state-created entities to act in ways that
violate state law are more infrequent and more fraught from a federalism
perspective, raising concerns of federal commandeering of state institutions and
undermining the integrity and sovereignty of state governments.124 Although the
Court has recently signaled that such federal authorization of local violations of
state law may raise federalism concerns, in the past it has sustained federal power
to preempt state-law limits on actions by localities.125
D. Preemption Under the Obama Administration
A final key federalism issue is preemption. Preemption was a central
federalism battleground during the Bush Administration, in large part due to
efforts by administrative agencies to preempt state tort suits.126 By contrast, the
Obama Administration has taken a more restrictive approach to preemption. In an
important early move, President Obama issued a presidential memorandum
emphasizing that agencies should preempt state law ―only with full consideration
of the legitimate prerogatives of the States[,]... with a sufficient legal basis for
preemption‖ and if ―justified under legal principles governing preemption,‖
ANCHORAGE
DAILY
NEWS,
Aug.
10,
2009,
available
at
http://www.adn.com/2009/08/10/893955/legislature-overrides-palins-stimulus.html.
123. See Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era of
State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 971-75 (2007) (listing examples).
124. See Roderick M. Hills Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of Federal Law to Free State and
Local Officials from State Legislatures‘ Control, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1201, 1206-25 (1999) (noting
and critiquing arguments against such federal authorization); see also D. Cody Huffaker,
Comment, A New Type of Commandeering: The Bypass Clause of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1055, 1057 (2010) (arguing that the Recovery Act‘s
authorization of a state legislature to accept stimulus funds over a governor‘s opposition violates
the anticommandeering doctrine).
125. Compare Nixon v. Miss. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 140-41 (2004) (―[O]ur working
assumption [is] that federal legislation threatening to trench on the States‘ arrangements for
conducting their own governments should be treated with great skepticism, and read in a way that
preserves a State‘s chosen disposition of its own power.‖), with Lawrence Cnty. v. LeadDeadwood Sch. Dist. No. 40-I, 469 U.S. 256, 270 (1985) (holding that state statute requiring local
governments to distribute federal payments in lieu of taxes in same way as general tax revenues
was preempted by federal statute authorizing such payments); Davidson, supra note , at 986-1000
(discussing tension between Nixon and prior precedent); Hills, supra note , at 1207-16 (arguing
that precedent does not support a prohibition on such federal authorizations).
126. See Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism and Federal Agency Reform, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2-3
(2011) (describing major preemption decisions from the 2008-09 term). In surveys, state officials
express frustration over perceived increases in federal preemption. See JOHN D. NUGENT,
SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM: HOW STATES PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS IN NATIONAL
POLICYMAKING 37, 48 (2009) (listing opposition to preemption as second most common NGA and
NCSL policy statement).
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including the restrictions on preemption imposed under Executive Order 13132.127
The Obama Administration further instructed agencies to cease including
preemption statements in regulatory preambles that were not included in codified
regulations and to conduct a review of all regulations in the last ten years that
included preemptive statements and provisions to determine if preemption is
justified under governing legal principles.128 More recently, President Obama
issued another memorandum instructing agencies to work closely with state, local,
and tribal governments to achieve greater administrative flexibility and lower
administrative burdens from federal requirements, directing the OMB to lead the
process.129
The Obama Preemption Memorandum appears to have had an effect. A
study that Catherine Sharkey conducted for the Administrative Conference of the
United States found that in a majority of agencies surveyed, the Memorandum
―led to serious internal review.‖130 Two agencies, the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA) in the Department of Transportation and the
independent Consumer Products Safety Commission, adopted notably more
cautious positions on preemption, with NHTSA going so far as to remove
preemptive language in a couple of earlier rulemakings.131 In another early antipreemption move, in January 2009 President Obama directed the EPA to
reconsider that agency‘s denial, under the Bush Administration, of California‘s
request for a Clean Air Act waiver to allow it to impose tighter greenhouse gas
emission restrictions on new cars.132 EPA subsequently granted the California
waiver and issued a finding that greenhouse gases endanger public health and
welfare EPA also reached an agreement with the auto industry, California, and
other stakeholders to impose the first national greenhouse gas emission limits on
cars and trucks.133 The Obama Administration also took a narrow approach to
127. Obama Preemption Memo, supra note , at 24,693-94.
128. Id.
129. President Barack Obama, Government Reform for Competitiveness and Innovation, 76 Fed.
Reg. 14,273, 14,273 (Mar. 11, 2011).
130. CATHERINE M. SHARKEY, FEDERAL AGENCY PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW 11 (2010),
available
at
http://www.acus.gov/wpcontent/uploads/downloads/2010/12/Sharkey_Draft_ACUS_Report_2010_11_27.pdf.
131. Id. at 12-28, 45-53. The study found that the effect on the Food and Drug Administration,
another agency that undertook prominent efforts at administrative preemption during the Bush
Administration, was less clear, although many of the preemption efforts of the OCC were
addressed by Dodd-Frank. See id. at 12, 28-44.
132. See Memorandum, State of California Request for Waiver Under 42 U.S.C. 7543(b), the
Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 4905 (Jan. 26, 2009) (directing, six days after President Obama‘s
inauguration, the EPA Administrator to reassess the Bush Administration's decision to deny
California's waiver request).
133. See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch.
I); U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse
Gases
Under
Section
202(a)
of
the
Clean
Air
Act,
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preemption in both ACA and Dodd-Frank. As noted, both measures limit
preemption to state measures that conflict with their requirements, and DoddFrank additionally adopts procedural and evidentiary requirements to further
restrict the preemptive power of federal financial regulators.134 In making clear
that states can impose additional requirements, both measures thus come down
firmly on the side of federal law serving as a regulatory floor, rather than as a
regulatory ceiling.135
The Obama Administration‘s preemption stance in court, however, has
been more equivocal. In some contexts, the Administration has reversed Bush era
positions and taken an anti-preemption stance.
Two examples are the
Administration‘s opposition to preemption from a federal vehicle safety standard
and label restrictions for generic drugs in cases before the Court last term.136 But
the Administration also urged preemption in other cases pending before the Court,
including a suit involving the Vaccine Act and one addressing an Arizona
measure targeting employment of illegal immigrants. 137
Indeed, the
http://epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment.html (last visited June 4, 2011); U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, EPA Will Propose Historic Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Light-Duty
Vehicles (May 2009), http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/regulations/420f09028.pdf. California
agreed to defer to the national standards through 2016. News Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
EPA
Grants
California
GHG
Waiver
(June
30,
2009),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/newsroom/newsreleases.htm.
134. See supra text accompanying notes , -.
135. See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling
Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1585–99 (2007) (discussing floor/ceiling distinction in
preemption).
136. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 8–9, Williamson v.
Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131 (2011) (No. 08-1314) (arguing against preemption);
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 22-30, PLIVA, Inc. v.
Mensing, Actavis Elizabeth, LLC v. Mensing, and Actavis, Inc. v. Demahy (Nos. 09-993, 091039, and 09-1501) (U.S. Mar. 2, 2011) (arguing against preemption of state-law claims based on
inadequate labeling of generic drugs); see also Letter from Sharon Swingle, Appellate Staff, U.S.
Dep‘t of Justice, to Marcia M. Waldron, Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Apr.
28, 2009) (withdrawing a previously submitted amicus brief supporting preemption of state failure
to warn claims based on drug labeling in Colaccio v. Apotex, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1578 (2009)). The
Supreme Court agreed and rejected preemption in Williamson, 131 S. Ct. 1131 (2011), but upheld
the claim of preemption in Pliva, 2011 WL 2472790 (No. 09-993 et al., June 23, 2011).
137. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 6–9, Bruesewitz v.
Wyeth, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1068 (2011) (No. 09-152) [hereinafter Bruesewitz Amicus Brief]; Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 8–10, Chamber of Commerce of the
U.S. v. Whiting (No. 09-115) (U.S. Sept. 8, 2010) [hereinafter Whiting Amicus Brief]
(summarizing argument in favor of preemption). Again, the Administration had a fifty percent
success rate with its preemption arguments. See Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct.
1968, 1987 (2011) (rejecting preemption); Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1082 (2011)
(upholding preemption). Also worthy of note is the Obama Administration‘s opposition to a suit
brought by eight states challenging power plants‘ greenhouse gas emissions as a public nuisance,
but that case focused displacement of federal common law nuisance claims rather than preemption
of state law. See America Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 2011 WL 2437011 at *4, *12 (holding
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Administration has taken a strongly pro-preemption position in the immigration
context, filing suit in district court to have another Arizonan immigration measure
declared preempted.138 Moreover, in this suit the Administration asserted
potentially broad claims of federal exclusivity and field preemption and not
simply that the state measure at issue conflicted with federal laws and
administrative determinations.139
II. ASSESSING THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION‘S FEDERALISM RECORD
The measures just detailed represent major developments at the national
level, with the federal government in short order undertaking substantial new
regulatory responsibilities and funding commitments. These measures also stand
out for the significant effect they will have on the states and the relationship
between federal and state governments. Assessing their impact on federalism is
complicated by the numerous ways the states are incorporated into the new
federal regimes and the expanded power and funding they can receive in return.
Nonetheless, two key points emerge. First, the central dynamic at play in these
instances is not nation versus state, but rather greater regulation versus more
limited government, along with broader disputes over substantive policy.
Federalism thus operates largely as a second-order concern. Second, the broad
powers these measures delegate underscore the importance of administrative
federalism. Despite Congress‘s central role in enacting these measures, the
administrative arena will be where the metes and bounds of modern day
federalism are determined. Combined with recognition of the minimal protection
the current federalism doctrine offers the states, this suggests that the greatest
federalism benefits may lie in details of institutional design or non-federalismspecific legal constraints, such as administrative law.
A. Nation Versus State, or Activist Government Versus Laissez-Faire?
Although the preemption restrictions that President Obama has imposed
are important, the clear trend of the developments discussed above is toward
federal common law claims displaced and remanding for consideration of whether state common
law claims were preempted); Brief for the Tennessee Valley Authority as Respondent Supporting
Petitioners at 3, 42–53, Am. Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut (No. 10-174) (U.S. Aug. 24, 2010)
[hereinafter TVA Brief] (addressing only federal common law issue).
138. See United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 986 (D. Ariz. 2010).
139. See, e.g., Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 986, 991-92 (―The United States argues principally that
the power to regulate immigration is vested exclusively with the federal government, and the
provisions of S.B. 1070 are therefore preempted by federal law‖ and also that it ―interferes and
conflicts with federal immigration law, foreign relations, and foreign policy.‖); Brief for Appellee
at 32, United States v. Arizona, No. 10-16645 (9th Cir. Sept. 23, 2010) (arguing Arizona
immigration law ―substantially infringe[s] on the exclusive federal regulation of immigration and
the conditions placed on the presence of foreign nationals in the United States‖)[hereinafter
Arizona Appellee Brief].
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expansion of federal power. This trend is perhaps most evident with respect to
health care reform. To be sure, ACA was not the federal government‘s first sortie
into regulation of health care or health insurance; Medicare, Medicaid, ERISA,
and HIPAA are preexisting federal measures in these contexts.140 Even so, ACA
represents an expansion of federal regulation to address issues previously left to
state control, such as the reasonableness of premium increases or substantive
coverage requirements for individual health insurance policies.141 Similarly,
despite already expansive federal financial regulation, Dodd-Frank also extended
the federal government‘s reach to contexts, for instance the sale of derivatives or
executive compensation, in which it had been largely absent. It also granted
federal regulators new powers, with the FDIC‘s new liquidation authority over
systemically important financial institutions as a prime example.142 And the
Recovery Act‘s additional federal funding for states came with new conditions
and strings attached.143
Yet it is also clear that these measures do not represent a pure assertion of
federal power at the expense of the states. Instead, a striking feature of all of these
reforms is the extent to which the states are offered central roles to play in the
new federal regimes, with broad grants of authority and federal funds to entice
their participation. Abbe Gluck has recently described the variety of roles for the
states evident in ACA, with some provisions authorizing either exclusive federal
or exclusive state control and others representing an amalgam of cooperative or

140. See Leonard, supra note , at 143-44 (discussing ERISA and HIPAA); CATHERINE HOFFMAN,
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., FOCUS ON HEALTH REFORM, NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE—A BRIEF
HISTORY
OF
REFORM
EFFORTS
IN
THE
U.S.
(2009),
available
at
http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/7871.pdf (providing history of Medicare and Medicaid as
part of effort to obtain national health insurance).
141. See Robert Pear, Health Insurers to Be Required to Justify Rate Increases over 10 Percent,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2010, at A21 (describing new regulations on premium increases as ―a major
expansion of federal authority in an area long regulated by states‖); Amy B. Monahan, Initial
Thoughts on Essential Health Benefits 3–4 (Univ. of Minn. Legal Studies Research Paper Series,
Research
Paper
No.
10-36,
2010),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1646723 (―For the first time, the federal
government is taking the primary role in regulating the substance of health insurance coverage.‖).
142. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 203–205, 124 Stat. 1376, 1450-1458 (2010)
(empowering Treasury ―to liquidate failing financial companies that pose a significant risk to the
financial stability of the United States‖); id. §§ 721–754 (authorizing regulation of derivatives and
other ―swap markets‖); id. §§ 951–957 (requiring new executive compensation regulation); see
also Damian Paletta & Aaron Lucchetti, Law Remakes U.S. Financial Landscape, WALL ST. J.,
July 16, 2010, at A1 (calling Dodd-Frank ―the biggest expansion of government power over
banking and markets since the Depression,‖ including ―expansive new authority over
derivatives‖); Edward Wyatt, A Scale-Back Is Possible in Financial Overhaul Law, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 2010, at B4 (noting SEC‘s ―100 [new] rulemaking provisions‖ and CFTC‘s ―30 broad
areas of new rulemaking‖).
143. See supra notes -07 (describing conditions on federal funds in Recovery Act); infra text
accompanying notes - (discussing general constitutionality of conditional federal funding).
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parallel federal and state responsibilities.144 Dodd-Frank also constitutes a
significant expansion of state regulatory authority, with states granted power to
enforce new federal requirements and also enjoying broadened authority to
enforce state law against national banks.145 The Recovery Act is a prime example
of this dual federal and state enhancing character: the vast majority of state funds
were made available under preexisting formulas with the states being allowed a
fair amount of flexibility in spending at the same time as the government also
expanded its use of competitive project grants to change state programs.
Moreover, these new federal measures also appear to preserve a good deal
of room for state innovation and regulatory flexibility. Under ACA, states have
discretion over key issues such as how health exchanges will operate, whether
they will impose additional requirements on insurers, and, through NAIC, the
criteria for premium increases and rebates.146 States can also seek waivers to
operate programs that deviate from ACA‘s requirements.147 In the financial
context, Dodd-Frank allows states to impose greater consumer protections without
fear of federal preemption, and enforce federal requirements.148 Although Race to
the Top created a strong incentive for states to adopt particular reforms of their
education systems, such as common assessment standards and teacher
performance accountability, even here states had flexibility over how to
incorporate the new features into their K-12 programs.149
Why these federal initiatives give the states such central responsibilities is
an interesting question, and several factors are likely at work. One is the fact that
the areas addressed—health insurance, consumer protection, and education—are
traditional areas of state authority and control.150 As a result, states already have
144. See Gluck, supra note , at 34-35 (discussing ―parallel federalism‖ in ACA provisions
regarding temporary high-risk pools and health insurance exchanges).
145
See supra text accompanying notes [76-81, 86]
146. See ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2718, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (allowing states to regulate
rebate percentages); id. § 2701 (allowing states to regulate rating areas for premium increases); id.
§§ 1321–1324 (providing flexibility to states in operation of exchanges); id. § 1323(b)(3)
(allowing states to require additional benefits); see also supra notes - and accompanying text
(describing areas of state flexibility and control in the ACA).
147. See ACA § 1332m, 124 Stat. at 203 (allowing states to apply to the Secretary of HHS for a
waiver of certain ACA provisions).
148. See supra text accompanying notes -.
149. See supra text accompanying notes –12.
150. Insurance was left for state control under McCarran-Ferguson even after the Court held
insurance fell within the scope of the commerce power. See McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1011–1015 (2006) (providing exclusive power to regulate and tax ―the business of insurance‖
to states); see also Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 427-31 (1946) (upholding state
regulation of insurance, post-McCarran-Ferguson); United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass‘n, 322
U.S. 533, 552–53 (1944) (holding that the federal government may regulate insurance under its
Commerce Clause power), superseded by statute, Pub. L. No. 79-15, 59 Stat. 33. Similarly, states
have long played a central role in consumer protection through state tort law, statutes, and
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extensive experience and expertise in these areas plus existing administrative
structures that could be used to implement new regulatory programs and
requirements. Moreover, in areas like health and education, prior federal
interventions have often taken the form of cooperative federal-state programs.151
To some degree, then, the new federal initiatives followed a familiar and expected
administrative structure in their reliance on the states, though the extent of
authority delegated and some of the responsibilities assigned are still unusual.152
Reliance on the states also served to deflect political opposition from state
government organizations anxious about displacement of state authority.153
Indeed, that the expansions in state responsibilities occurred during the legislative
debate over ACA and Dodd-Frank suggests that the roles given to the states were
important to the ultimate passage of both measures.154 In addition, delegating to
the states provided a mechanism to foster experimentation in policies and
implementation, a traditional justification for federalism that also underlies
arguments for restrictions on preemption.155
enforcement actions by state attorneys general. See DEE PRIDGEN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND
THE LAW §§ 2–7 (detailing the state role in consumer protection law). The states‘ centrality in
education is often acknowledged. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995)
(noting that education is an area ―where States historically have been sovereign‖); Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741 (1974) (―No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted
than local control over the operation of schools.‖).
151. See, e.g., No Child Left Behind Act, 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (2006) (requiring states to submit
plans to improve education but allowing flexibility in details of education standards); 42 U.S.C. §§
1397bb–1397gg (2006) (requiring a general state child health plan for states to receive federal
funds under the State Children‘s Health Insurance Program but allowing flexibility in
implementation); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410, 7416 (2006) (requiring states to submit
implementation plans but retaining state authority to regulate emissions and air pollution).
152. For example, in several instances ACA assigns primary regulatory and enforcement
responsibilities to NAIC and the states, with HHS accorded a secondary role. See, e.g., § 1001,
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 10101(f), 124
Stat. 1029 (2010) (adding § 2718(c) to the Public Health Services Act, which authorized NAIC to
issue definitions of what counts as medical services); id. § 1003, 124 Stat. at 139 (adding § 2794
to the Public Health Services Act, which provided for concomitant review of premium increases
by states and the Secretary of HHS and required state approval of increases when authorized by
state law); id. § 1311, 124 Stat. at 173 (creating health benefit exchanges to be implemented by the
states unless the Secretary determines state implementation is inadequate). The states‘ power to
force the Consumers Bureau to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking is also a new innovation.
See supra text accompanying note ; see also NAT‘L ASS‘N OF ATT‘YS GEN., WALL STREET
REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 4 (2010) (terming it ―apparently unique‖).
153. NAT‘L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES STANDING COMMITTEE ON COMMUNICATIONS,
FINANCIAL SERVICES & INTERSTATE COMMERCE, DRAFT POLICY STATEMENT: STATE
SOVEREIGNTY
IN
FINANCIAL
SERVICES,
available
at
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/standcomm/sccomfc/StateSovereigntyAM.pdf.
154. See supra text accompanying notes -, .
155. For identification of ACA and Race to the Top in experimentalist terms, see JULIETTE
FORESTENZER ESPINOSA, ACADEMYHEALTH: REIMAGINING FEDERAL AND STATE ROLES FOR
HEALTH REFORM UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 1, 5 (2010),
available
at
http://www.academyhealth.org/files/publications/ResInsightsReformRoles.pdf;
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Equally important was the recent history of the states as progressive policy
reformers. During the Bush Administration, progressive regulatory and
enforcement initiatives occurred largely at the state and local level.156 For
example, Massachusetts‘s 2006 reform provided a forerunner to ACA‘s approach
of relying on private health insurance, health exchanges, an individual coverage
mandate, subsidies, and substantive insurance regulation.157 States were also more
aggressive at addressing financial sector abuses and global warming, often in the
face of federal resistance.158 The effect was to transform many advocates of
progressive policies and more aggressive regulation into defenders of state
prerogatives.159 This defense of state regulation is most clearly evident in the new
limits on preemption but also seems likely to have contributed to a greater
willingness to have states play key implementation roles in federal regulatory
schemes. The fact that many cabinet officers and high-level officials in the
Obama Administration came directly from jobs in state government may also
have contributed to their willingness to delegate broad responsibilities to the
states.160

Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative
State,
GEO.
L.
REV.
(forthcoming)
(manuscript
at
32),
available
at
www2.law.columbia.edu/sabel/Min.2.3.docx (describing Race to the Top as an example of the
―incentive design‖ variation of experimentalist governance); see also New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (―It is one of the happy incidents of
the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory;
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.‖); Ernest A.
Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 130 (2004) (―The whole point
of preemption is generally to force national uniformity on a particular issue, stifling state-by-state
diversity and experimentation.‖).
156. See David J. Barron, Foreword, Blue State Federalism at the Crossroads, 3 HARV. L. & POL‘Y
REV. 1, 1–2 (2009); see also Robert A. Schapiro, Not Old or Borrowed: The Truly New Blue
Federalism, 3 HARV. L. & POL‘Y REV. 33, 33–34, 40–51 (2009).
157. See Stephen M. Weiner, Payment Reform After PPACA: Is Massachusetts Leading the Way
Again?, 11 YALE J. HEALTH POL‘Y L. & ETHICS 33, 33 & n.3 (2011).
158. See Kirsten H. Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Change in the United States: A Regional
Approach, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 54, 60 (2005) (noting ―the multitude of greenhouse gas
reduction activities occurring on the state and local level‖); Schapiro, supra note , at 40-43;
Wilmarth, Supreme Court Responds, supra note , at 3, 19–22, 26.
159. See Schapiro, supra note , at 33 (arguing the ―trend of state-level reform represents a kind of
return to the early Progressive movement...when state-sponsored programs constituted the core of
the Progressive agenda‖); see also Ernest A. Young, Welcome to the Dark Side: Liberals
Rediscover Federalism in the Wake of the War on Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1277, 1277-78,
1302-08 (2004) (noting and encouraging such a move by liberals toward the states in response to
the Bush Administration‘s national security policies).
160. For example, prior to joining the Obama Administration, seven of the sixteen members of
President Obama‘s cabinet were former state governors or high-level state and local officials:
Shaun Donovan, Arne Duncan, Gary Locke, Janet Napolitano, Kathleen Sebelius, Ken Salazar,
and Tom Vilsack. Two agency officials with cabinet rank were also former state governors Lisa
Jackson, Ron Kirk. See E-mail from Matt Huppert, Research Assistant, to author (Apr. 1, 2011)
(on file with author).
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Whatever the reason, the central roles the states play mean that portraying
these new federal measures as a zero-sum contest that the national government
won and the states lost is false. Several scholars have argued that conceptualizing
federalism in zero-sum terms, with the states and the federal government fighting
over who gets to exercise authority in any given area, fundamentally
misunderstands the overlapping and negotiated character of contemporary federalstate relations.161 The recent initiatives demonstrate this point, as their central
characteristic is expanded authority at both the national and state levels. For many
states the measures are empowering, granting them the authority and resources
they need to undertake more effective reform and more aggressive enforcement.
Perhaps as important, the imposition of minimum federal requirements protects
states from having their regulatory initiatives undermined by interstate mobility
and other states‘ more limited oversight.162 Undoubtedly, for those states that
would prefer not to participate in the new federal initiatives, such as states that
oppose the Medicaid expansion or assessing teachers based on student
performance, the story is quite different. But the constraints these states feel is
more a result of their disagreement with the Administration‘s substantive policies
and their reluctance to assume the new governance responsibilities being offered
than an inherent characterization of these initiatives as assertions of national
power.163

161. See ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (2009) (emphasizing that federalism today means concurrent and
overlapping authority); Ryan, supra note , at 3-6 (arguing that federalism is best understood as an
iterative process of negotiated bargaining between state and federal actors).
162. Substantial literature exists on the question of whether interstate mobility and state variation
leads to a regulatory race to the bottom. Compare, e.g., Richard J. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom
and Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535, 538–40
(1997) (discussing the logic of why ―race-to-the-bottom justification‖ for centralized federal
environmental regulation is unpersuasive), with Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental StandardSetting: Is There a ―Race‖ and Is It ―To the Bottom‖?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 351–54 (1997)
(arguing that empirical evidence ―provide[s] prima facie evidence that states are indeed engaged in
a race-to-the-bottom‖). Interstate mobility and the ability of insurers to leave a state‘s individual
policy market undermined earlier state efforts to prohibit health insurers from discriminating
against preexisting conditions. See, e.g., Amicus Brief on Behalf of the Governors of Washington,
Colorado, Michigan, and Pennsylvania in Support of Defendant‘s Motion for Summary Judgment
at 5, Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120
(N.D. Fla. 2010) (No. 10-CV-91-RV-EMT) (describing the ―‗death spiral‘ that can occur in the
insurance market when coverage for preexisting conditions is required without universal
coverage‖).
163. Support for this view comes from the Florida ACA litigation. There, although twenty-six
states challenged the Medicaid expansion as coercive, another five states filed an amicus brief
rejecting that characterization and asserting that the expansion would lower their healthcare costs.
See Brief of the States of Oregon, Iowa, Vermont, Maryland, and Kentucky as Amici Curiae at 2,
McCollum, 716 F. Supp. 2d (No. 10-CV-91-RV-EMT) (―Absent national reform, state-level
health care costs will rise dramatically over the next 10 years.‖).
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Indeed, the central dynamic evident in these initiatives is not nation versus
state but instead greater governmental intervention versus laissez-faire reliance on
the market. ACA and Dodd-Frank stand as testaments to the belief that the
government needs to play a more active regulatory role and the powers granted to
states are geared to producing greater oversight of the health insurance market and
the financial sector. ACA encourages greater state regulation by mandating direct
federal implementation if state efforts prove inadequate, whereas Dodd-Frank
creates a federal regulatory floor but protects states‘ abilities to impose additional
requirements.164 The limits placed on administrative preemption, and
administrative moves such as the approval of California‘s request to regulate
greenhouse gas auto emissions,165 are of a piece with this overall activist
government stance. The stimulus measure as a whole similarly reflects this thrust
toward more activist government, as it represented a massive fiscal intervention in
hopes of sparking economic recovery.166 The substantial increase in state
Medicaid rolls is yet another example of an expanded governmental role.167 Not
surprisingly, therefore, the federalism dimension of the Administration‘s
initiatives has accrued more to the benefit of states desirous of playing an activist
role than states that prefer a more antiregulatory approach.
To be sure, this proregulatory emphasis is not universal. The Obama
Administration will not support every effort by states to play a greater regulatory
role, as demonstrated by its effort to prohibit Arizona from undertaking additional
immigration enforcement.168 Nor does the proregulatory-antiregulatory divide
map as well in the education context, in which one goal of Race to the Top was to
encourage states to repeal existing regulations viewed as inhibiting educational
improvement. Moreover, a lack of federal action need not mean similar regulatory
quietude on the part of the states; far from it. During the Bush Administration
many states sought to fill the regulatory gaps that federal inaction created, and
some states continue to push greater state regulation on issues that are not being
addressed—or are not being addressed adequately—at the federal level.169
Nonetheless, the overwhelming thrust of federalism under the Obama
Administration, as these four initiatives reveal, has been toward encouraging
greater state regulatory efforts.

164. See supra notes , - and accompanying text.
165. See supra text accompanying notes -12.
166. See supra text accompanying notes -.
167. See supra text accompanying notes -.
168. See supra notes -37 and accompanying text.
169. See supra text accompanying notes -56; see also Vivian E. Thompson & Vicki Arroyo,
Upside-Down Cooperative Federalism: Climate Change Policymaking and the States, 29 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 1, 6-10 (2011) (describing past and ongoing state efforts to lower greenhouse gas
emissions).
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Put slightly differently, the federalism supportive features of these
initiatives are inextricably linked to the Administration‘s progressive policy goals
and activist government stance.170 Most obviously, assigning the states a
significant role was at times strategically necessary to secure passage of these
initiatives.171 But the connection to the Administration‘s political agenda went
deeper. Empowering the states provided a mechanism for enhanced enforcement
and regulatory oversight in line with the Administration‘s policy views. The
Administration‘s resistance to independent state efforts on immigration also
showcases this point, as this resistance appears driven in part by concerns that
such state efforts will lead to discrimination and harassment of lawfully present
aliens as well as undermine the Adminsitration‘s immigration policy.172
Incorporating the states also creates the potential for greater policy entrenchment
over time as state officials become more invested in the new federal programs.173
Moreover, in the current political climate relying on the states may provide the
Administration with an avenue for pushing its policy agenda despite increased
resistance to aggressive regulatory enforcement at the federal level.174
Such reliance on the states also comes with policy risks, in particular the
possibility that resistance at the state level may undermine successful
implementation of the new policies..175 But that risk is mitigated to some degree
by two features of these initiatives: first, that implementation of the new policies
is a required condition of substantial federal funding and, second, that the federal
170

See Greenblatt, supra note , at 28 (―Washington needs states to carry out its grand visions on
the ground, but the administration also fully intends to give them numerous pushes in its preferred
direction.‖).
171. See supra notes , and accompanying text.
172
See Arizona Appelle Brief, supra note , at 24-29, 30-34, 37-39; Whiting Amicus Brief, supra
note , at 17-18. Correspondingly, the Administration has also limited local governments‘
immigration enforcement authority under agreements with the federal government in response to
concerns about overly aggressive enforcement. See Ryan, supra note , at 34-35.
173. See Gluck, supra note , at 36-38 (identifying this entrenching dynamic in the context of
ACA); see also supra notes -56, and accompanying text. In the terms of positive political theory,
incorporating states in federal programs and federal administration thus appears as a structural
protection against legislative and bureaucratic drift. See generally McNollgast, Structure and
Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies,
75 Va. L. Rev. 431 (1989).
174. See Wyatt, supra note , at B4 (noting Republican opposition to and delay of Dodd-Frank
provisions).
175. See Kevin Sack, Republicans Rise to Power, with Enmity for Health Law, N.Y. T IMES, Nov.
19, 2010, at A13 (―The tectonic movement in state politics across the country after the Nov. 2
election has left the health care law in hostile hands in many places, just as responsibility for
carrying out the law begins to fall most heavily on the states.‖). Such resistance has occurred in
the past in other contexts. See NUGENT, supra note , at 65-67, 193-200 (noting state resistance to
implementing federal education requirements and REAL ID); Denise Scheberle, The Evolving
Matrix of Environmental Federalism and Intergovernmental Relationships, 35 PUBLIUS 69, 77
(2005) (noting examples of states ―challenging the EPA‘s ability to enforce tighter standards under
the Clean Air Act‖).

33

government is authorized to step in and replace underperforming states.176
Moreover, the federal government may not face the same practical obstacles to
taking over implementation in the health insurance context as it sometimes has
encountered in other areas.177 It not only already has substantial experience
running the Federal Employees‘ Health Benefits program, 178 the military‘s
TRICARE system,179 as well as Medicare, but also can use the same health
exchange model in a number of states.180
The question remains, however, whether these measures represent
federalism. Some might dispute that description, arguing that the very fact that
states must adhere to an overall policy agenda emanating from Washington
precludes understanding these measures in federalism terms. Others might view
these initiatives more as decentralized programmatic implementation than
federalism, given that the scope of the states‘ authority is set by federal statute
and the presence of federal minimum standards to which they must adhere.181
Underlying these arguments is an insistence on federalism as necessitating
freedom on the part of the states to pursue policies of their own choosing, even
at—perhaps especially at—the expense of national goals.182
But demanding such policy or enforcement independence represents too
narrow a definition of federalism. To begin with, broad federal power is a given
of our national modern administrative state, one that the Supreme Court may
176. In some instances, however, HHS‘s ability to enforce ACA‘s requirements when a state has
failed to do so is not clear. Concern that HHS lacks power to enforce ACA‘s limitations on
unreasonable premium increases has led to proposals for enhanced HHS authority. See Health
Insurance Rate Authority Act of 2011, S. 3078, 111th Cong. § 2 (2011) (proposing the
establishment of a Health Insurance Rate Authority and centralized authority for HHS to review
and correct unreasonable premium increases); Ann Mills, Carolyn L. Engelhard & Patricia M.
Tereskerz, Truth and Consequences—Insurance-Premium Rate Regulation and the ACA, 363
NEW ENG. J. MED. 899, 900 (2010) (noting a ―lack of regulatory teeth in the ACA‖ and supporting
additional powers for HHS in premium increase regulation).
177. See NUGENT, supra note , at 172-78 (arguing that federal officials‘ dependence on state
implementers often means they lack ability to sanction state noncompliance); DENISE SCHEBERLE,
FEDERALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: TRUST AND THE POLITICS OF IMPLEMENTATION 18788 (1997) (noting that the federal government lacks the fiscal or organizational capacity to take
over responsibility for state-level environmental implementation); Larry Kramer, Understanding
Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1544 (1994) (―Realistically speaking, Congress can neither
abandon these programs nor ‗fire‘ the states and have federal bureaucrats assume full
responsibility for them.‖).
178. See Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, 5 C.F.R. § 890 (2010).
179. See TRICARE Program, 32 C.F.R. § 199.17 (2010).
180. Gluck, supra note , at 40 (―Running insurance exchanges in a small number of states will
enable the federal government to build expertise in this area of traditional state control.‖).
181. See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feely, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41
UCLA L. REV. 903, 910-14 (1993) (distinguishing federalism and decentralization).
182. Id. at 913 (―[F]ederalism ... is the right of states to act independently, in furtherance of goals
the national government does not share.‖).
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tinker with at the edges but is not going to fundamentally alter.183 As a result,
equating federalism with independence from national policy would render it
largely irrelevant in a vast array of governance contexts. In addition, such a
definition is not constitutionally mandated.184 Indeed, although the Court has at
times identified federalism with state independence, it has also sanctioned federalstate cooperation and treated federalism as a more general value to be applied
within federal regulatory schemes and not simply to set these schemes‘
boundaries.185 Nor does a definition of federalism in terms of independence
accord with our lived experience, which is dominated by federalism in the form of
negotiated, cooperative, and sometimes uncooperative federal-state
relationships.186 Lastly, although characterizing initiatives like ACA as
decentralized administration is certainly plausible, viewing them solely in
decentralization terms misses an important part of the story. In particular, pressure
to ensure a role for the states per se is a main reason why these initiatives have a
decentralized form and were enacted at all.187

183. See Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023,
2048 (2008) (emphasizing ―the Court's unwillingness to curb congressional regulatory authority
on constitutional federalism grounds‖).
184. Scholars have recently articulated accounts of federalism that emphasize concurrent
authority, multilevel empowerment, and shared problem solving capacity. See ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, ENHANCING GOVERNMENT: FEDERALISM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2008);
(forthcoming 2011); SCHAPIRO, supra note ; Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within:
Seeking Checks and Balances in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503 (2007); see
also Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Legitimacy of Free Standing Federalism, 122 HARV.
L. REV. F. 98 (2009) (defending extrapolation of broad constitutional federalism principles and
values). For a contrary view of constitutional federalism as encompassing solely the specific
federal-state compromises incorporated into the Constitution, see John F. Manning, Federalism
and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2040
(2009).
185. See, e.g., Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 295-96 (2006)
(applying a federalism-based clear statement rule to determine state obligations as a result of
participation in federal programs); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160-68 (1992)
(emphasizing the importance of federal and state governments‘ independent relationships with
individuals and therefore condemning federal commandeering of state legislatures while
upholding federal spending conditions on the states).
186. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J.
1256, 1271-84 (2009) (describing instances of state resistance from within federal programs);
Ryan, supra note , at 24–73 (identifying ways in which state and federal actors bargain over
collaborative governance); Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for
Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 665, 668-73 (emphasizing the political reality of
cooperative federalism). Identification of federalism in these partnership terms is of longstanding
duration, with the classic exposition being DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW
FROM THE STATES 2, 51-80 (3d ed. 1984).
187. See supra notes , , , , , and accompanying text; see also Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism,
82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 381-82 (1997) (noting states are a fundamental aspect of American
federalism and that ―we do not now have a choice between the federalism we have and a system of
unitary national authority, with the latter having the option to decentralize when it makes sense‖).
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An alternative approach, one I find more appealing, sees federalism as
encompassing instances in which state authority and state interests surface within
federal administration.188 On this account, whether the Obama initiatives actually
represent instances of federalism will depend on whether states are granted
meaningful authority over the content of the programs they administer or instead
have their discretion substantially limited. This view of federalism lacks clear
lines and risks obscuring substantial inroads on state authority in a wealth of
programmatic detail. It may also raise concerns about confused accountability and
the extent to which states will be able to serve federalism‘s oft-invoked benefit of
checking federal overreaching—although a strong case can be made that states
may have their greatest influence on the shape of federal policy when arguing
from within.189 But these issues are unavoidable once we acknowledge that the
intermingling of federal and state authority is a basic feature of federalism in the
context of modern governance.
The Obama Administration experience thus demonstrates that federalism
can be alive and well in a context of expanding national regulation. But this
experience also lends support to the skeptical view that ―federalism is destined to
be a second order concern.‖190 Even if qualifying as instances of federalism, the
measures described here represent deployment of federalism to achieve
progressive policy goals rather than ―as a principled end in and of itself.‖191 Nor is
federalism‘s second order status unique to liberals and progressives; conservative
support for federalism is often just as instrumental.192
Yet the Obama Administration‘s record also suggests that federalism‘s
second order status should not be a cause for alarm for advocates of a greater state
role. It indicates that progressives‘ discovery of the policy potential of state and
local governments was not simply an opposition strategy to be cast aside once
188. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note , at 2047-2109 (describing ways in which administrative
structure and administrative law can serve as federalism surrogates by protecting state interests in
the context of federal agency decisionmaking); see also Metzger, supra note , at 67-75 (describing
use of states and federalism to police federal administration).
189. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note , at 1265-71, 1285-92; see also Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (listing greater governmental diversity, citizen involvement,
innovation and experimentation, responsiveness and protection against governmental ―tyranny and
abuse‖ as federalism‘s benefits).
190. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the Roberts Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 345,
353 n.38 (2008); Devins, supra note , at 137; see also Cross, supra note , at 1307-12 (noting that
federalism is most often deployed derivatively to achieve some other ideological end).
191. Cross, supra note , at 1307.
192
Recent prominent examples of how conservatives‘ traditional support for the states is
contingent on substantive policy are the Bush Administration‘s aggressive preemption efforts, see
Metzger, supra note , at 2, 20 [Fed agency Reform] and conservative advocacy of a constitutional
amendment banning same-sex marriage in response to state authorization, see Shailagh Murray,
Gay Marriage Amendment Fails in the Senate, June 8, 2006, available at:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/07/AR2006060700830.html.
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they came into control of the national government.193 Despite their early twentieth
century emphasis on state government as an engine of reform, the New Deal
progressives became far more resistant to federalism and assertions of state
power, a resistance that was reinforced when federalism and states‘ rights became
a mantra for protection of segregation and race discrimination.194 To the extent
progressives‘ commitment to the states has staying power, it represents a potential
new force for federalist approaches at the national level. 195 At a minimum, the
fact that ACA and Dodd-Frank Act both became more friendly to state interests as
they worked their way through Congress reinforces claims that the political
safeguards of federalism can have real effect.196
B. The Central Importance of Administrative Federalism
A consistent theme runs through all four of the federalism measures listed
above, and that is the critical importance of federal administrative agencies in
determining the terms of state involvement and extent of state authority. For
example, HHS must issue regulations specifying standards for how health
exchanges can operate and determining what counts as not taking sufficient action
toward establishing an exchange such that the federal government must take over
implementation; the CFPB and the OCC are expressly granted power to preempt
state consumer protection laws, albeit under restrictive standards, and the states
are to consult with the CFPB before bringing suit to enforce its regulations; and
the Department of Education had broad authority to determine the criteria on
which state applications for Race to the Top funds would be assessed and the
weight assigned to factors like teacher performance accountability. Moreover,
these agencies‘ power to set the terms of state involvement are only one
manifestation of their responsibilities in implementing these measures, many
others of which will likely have a significant impact on the states.197
193. See Barron, supra note , at 4-7 (discussing the danger that progressives‘ ascension to power at
the national level might undermine their commitment to federalism and decentralization).
194. See Schapiro, supra note , at 34.
195. See Young, supra note , at 1308-11 (discussing the possibility that some liberals fear to
embrace federalism at the chance of appearing opportunistic).
196. For discussion and other contemporary examples of the political leverage states can wield,
see NUGENT, supra note , at 115-67.
197. To give an illustration from the ACA, noted above, see supra text accompanying notes -:
HHS is charged with determining what counts as essential benefits that health plans must cover as
well as the criteria for triggering review of unreasonable premium rate increases, determinations
that the state will implement through their decisions about whether a plan can participate in an
exchange and through their review of insurers. These determinations will also affect states‘
abilities to mandate additional benefits, as states will have to cover the cost of such additional
mandates for participants in an exchange. See ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 1003, 124 Stat. 119,
139 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2794) (providing for premium rate review by the states and
HHS); see also id. §§ 1302(b), 1311, 1321, 124 Stat. at 163, 173, 186 (regarding structure of
exchanges).
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No doubt, the fact that these statutes on their face incorporate a substantial
role for the states matters for how agencies structure state responsibilities and
precludes administrative efforts to preempt state authority of the kind that typified
the Bush Administration.198 Even so, the broad powers and responsibilities
delegated to federal agencies means that it will be these agencies, along with their
executive branch overseers, who determine whether these measures realize their
state-empowering potential. The Obama initiatives thus reinforce the view that
administrative agencies are the critical arena for determining the shape of federalstate relations. Recently, a number of federalism scholars have argued further that
administrative agencies represent a potentially powerful mechanism for protecting
state interests.199 The new measures provide an opportunity to test whether that
claim holds up in practice and to study the extent to which features such as
presidential involvement or congressional oversight prove important in
determining agency receptivity to state concerns.200
So far, states have fared relatively well in the administrative arena under
President Obama. Perhaps the clearest evidence of increased sensitivity to state
interests is the President‘s Preemption Memo and resultant pullback in
administrative preemption.201 Moreover, the record to date suggests some effort
by agencies to allow the states substantial flexibility and actively incorporate
them into the new federal regulatory schemes. In particular, HHS deferred
substantially to NAIC on some issues, such as setting medical-loss ratios and the
process for rate review, and has also proposed allowing states to choose between
more active and more minimalist approaches to running the health exchanges.202
HHS has granted numerous waivers of ACA‘s requirements, to both states and
private entities.203 It has also signaled a willingness to work with states that are
not ready to operate an exchange by the statutory deadline of January 1, 2013,
proposing the possibility of conditional approval and allowing states to seek to
198. See Metzger, supra note , at 20.
199. See Metzger, supra note , at 2072-91; see also Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note , at 1292
(discussing the ―administrative safeguards of federalism‖); Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld,
Administrative Law‘s Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal
Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1939, 1948-83 (2008) (arguing that ―for the most part, agencies
outperform‖ other federal branches as allocators of policysetting power); SHARKEY, supra note , at
49-55 (defending agencies as at least potentially attentive to state interests).
200. For a recent analysis of the role the President plays in shaping administrative preemption, see
Michele E. Gilman, Presidents, Preemption, and the States, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 339 (2010).
201. See supra notes -28 and accompanying text.
202. See Proposed Exchange Rule, supra note , 76 Fed. Reg. at 41867, 41891-92 (―The intent of
this proposed rule is to allow the States substantial discretion in the design and operation of an
Exchange.‖); Medical Loss Ratio Interim Final Rule), supra note , 75 Fed. Reg. at 74866 (―This
interim final regulation certifies and adopts the NAIC‘s model regulation in full.‖).
203. See Robert Pear, Making Exceptions in Obama‘s Health Care Act Draws Kudos, and
Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2011, at A21 (noting 94 percent of waiver applications have been
granted).
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take over federally-operated exchanges.204 Also notable are Elizabeth Warren‘s
efforts to foster a strong relationship between the CFPB and state attorneys
general.205 On the education front, the Department of Education has signaled its
willingness to waive accountability requirements of No Child Left Behind that
have triggered strong state resistance if Congress does not address the issue,
though such waivers would be contingent on states‘ agreeing to federal policy
priorities as in Race to the Top.206
To be sure, this administrative responsiveness to the states has limits. HHS
has so far resisted Republican governors‘ calls to waive the Medicaid
maintenance of effort requirements in light of state budget deficits, 207 and at least
one state organization has complained about being sidelined from FSOC
deliberations.208 In addition, such administrative responsiveness is no doubt
fueled in part by political realities: this is hardly a juncture in which HHS wants
to foster greater state resistance to ACA by taking an unduly restrictive approach
to state enforcement, and state AGs may represent the best chance for aggressive
consumer protection enforcement in the face of congressional Republican
opposition to Dodd-Frank.209 Further, despite being structured as an optional
program under which states could propose different approaches, Race to the Top
was more directive of the states, with states having to adopt certain reforms to
have a realistic chance of winning a grant. Again, therefore, agencies‘
commitment to federalism appears at least derivative of the Obama
Administration‘s underlying policy goals. Yet the states may still have real and
lasting influence, to the extent agency officials see them as crucial partners in
achieving progressive aims.210 The presence of former elected state officials in
high-level agency positions, perhaps most notably former Kansas Governor and
Insurance Commissioner Kathleen Sebelius as Secretary of HHS, may also lead to
greater administrative attentiveness to some state concerns.211
204

See Proposed Exchange Rule, supra note , at 41871-72.
See text accompanying note 88, supra.
206
See Sam Dillon, Education Secretary May Agree to Waivers on ‗No Child‘ Law Requirements,
N.Y. Times, June 12, 2011, at A25.
207. Robert Pear, Governors Get Advice for Saving on Medicaid, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2011, at
A11.
208. See Letter from Susan E. Voss, NAIC President, to Timothy Geithner, U.S. Sec‘y of the
Treasury
(Feb.
9,
2011),
available
at
http://www.naic.org/documents/testimony_letter_110209_fsoc_geithner.pdf.
209. See Wyatt, supra note , at B4.
210. See NUGENT, supra note , at 117; Metzger, supra note , at 2075 (describing the many ties that
give states leverage in federal decisionmaking); see also Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note , at
1263 (explaining that the states‘ role as federal servant also allows states to challenge federal
government).
211. See Kathleen Sebelius & Ned Sebelius, Bearing the Burden of the Beltway: Practical
Realities of State Government and Federal-State Relations in the Twenty-First Century, 3 HARV.
L. & POL‘Y REV. 9 (2009) (considering the practical realities of state-federal interaction and
recommending new approaches for state flexibility and creativity).
205
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Moreover, a striking feature of the recent federalism initiatives is their use
of structural mechanisms that give state officials a direct role in federal
administrative decisionmaking and potentially limit agencies‘ abilities to prevent
state involvement. Perhaps the most unusual are the provisions in Dodd-Frank for
state financial regulators to serve as non-voting members on the new FSOC212 and
in addition requiring that the CFPB issue a notice of proposed rulemaking on a
proposed consumer protection standard if a majority of states pass a resolution
supporting the measure.213 Also notable is Dodd-Frank‘s express grant of power
to the states to enforce the CFPB‘s regulations; although the states are precluded
from enforcing the statute directly, this provision gives them some independent
authority over federal consumer financial protection requirements. 214 To similar
effect is ACA‘s grant of primary responsibility to set the terms of medical-loss
ratios to NAIC, an association of state insurance officials. Other examples are the
Obama Preemption Memo‘s specific instruction that agencies undertake a tenyear review of preemptive regulations and its reinforcement of Executive Order
13132, a long-standing order that imposes certain requirements and procedures on
federal agencies when they are taking actions that affect state interests.215
President Obama‘s directive instructing OMB to lead an administration-wide
process of consulting with states and localities and streamlining their regulatory
burdens is simply the most recent instance in which states were formally
incorporated into the regulatory process.216 Additionally, the Administration has
employed a number of informal mechanisms aimed at ensuring coordination and
communication between federal and state officials, such as OMB‘s ad hoc
committee to oversee implementation of the federal stimulus.217
It remains to be seen how effective these mechanisms will be in protecting
state interests, but they represent potentially significant means for incorporating
federalism into the administrative level.218 A particularly interesting aspect of
these mechanisms is that they provide a means by which states not only can assert
212. See supra note and accompanying text.
213. Dodd-Frank Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 111, 124 Stat. 1376, 1392 (2010) (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. §5321).
214. For discussion of state enforcement of federal law, see generally Margaret H. Lemos, State
Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698 (2011).
215. Obama Preemption Memo, supra note , at 24,693-94; see Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism
Accountability: ―Agency-Forcing‖ Measures, 58 DUKE L.J. 2125, 2156-57 (2009).
216. See supra text accompanying note .
217. See supra text accompanying note .
218. These mechanisms accord with recent scholarship, in both the administrative law and
federalism arenas, that has focused on the importance of institutional design in controlling agency
behavior and interagency interactions. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding
Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2010); Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi,
Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 Harv. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2012);
Sharkey, supra note , at 2172-73
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their own interests in the administrative arena but further can directly police
federal agency performance. A comparison of the state supportive mechanisms in
ACA and Dodd-Frank highlights this feature. The ACA mechanisms, such as the
incorporation of NAIC and reliance on states to implement health exchanges and
review insurance rates, appear primarily focused on providing a sphere for state
discretion and benefitting from preexisting state expertise. By contrast, the
mechanisms in Dodd-Frank, in particular the states‘ ability to prod action from
the CFPB and independently enforce the CFPB‘s regulations, appear more
centered on using the states to guard against federal agency failure. This
difference in focus likely reflects the fact that ACA represents an expansion of the
federal government‘s role into areas previously left to the states, whereas DoddFrank represents an effort to strengthen existing federal financial regulation
against a background in which states had proved the more energetic prosecutors.
A similar effort to empower states to guard against federal agency failure is
evident in other recent legislation and in the Supreme Court‘s preemption
jurisprudence.219 Such recognition that the states can play a role in policing
federal administrative inaction as well as federal overreaching represents an
important broadening in approaches to administrative federalism.220
The dominance of administrative agencies in setting the scope of state
authority under these initiatives suggests another important protection for state
interests: administrative law. Although constitutional federalism doctrines had an
effect on these initiatives, it was largely an effect at the margin.221
Anticommandeering prohibitions underlie the use of spending and conditional
preemption to obtain state participation in ACA or Race to the Top.222 In addition,
219. See Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-314, §§ 207, 218,
122 Stat. 3016, 3045, 3061 (to be codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (allowing sharing of
information with state agencies and allowing state attorneys general to bring suit to enforce
provisions of Consumer Product Safety Act); Metzger, supra note , at 25-34 (arguing that the
Court‘s recent preemption decisions are best understood as reflecting a concern with federal
agency failure); Amy Widman, Advancing Federalism Concerns in Administrative Law Through a
Revitalization of State Enforcement Powers: A Case Study of the Consumer Product Safety and
Improvement Act of 2008, 29 YALE L. & POL‘Y REV. 165, 184–91 (2010) (observing ―massive
regulatory failure‖ as impetus for passage of the Act and concluding that involving states in
regulation ―can help overcome some of [the] collective action problems‖ associated with largescale regulatory efforts).
220. See Metzger, supra note , at 70-75 (discussing justifications for such a state role and
explaining that the value of having use of the states in this fashion originates in the political
branches).
221. See Metzger, supra note , at 2048-50 (discussing Court‘s reluctance to curb congressional
regulatory authority on constitutional federalism grounds).
222. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161-69, 188 (1992) (distinguishing
commandeering from conditional spending and conditional preemption and prohibiting federal
commandeering of state legislatures); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 907, 924-30
(2007) (prohibiting federal commandeering of state executive officials); Roderick M. Hills, Jr.,
The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and ―Dual
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the Court‘s recent preemption jurisprudence gave additional impetus to the
Obama Preemption Memo and was an obvious foil against which the preemption
provisions of Dodd-Frank were drafted. But what these initiatives really showcase
is the limited effectiveness of federalism doctrines in protecting the states from
substantial federal impositions.223 The Court has indicated that it will give broad
deference to comprehensive congressional regulation of economic activity, even if
it preempts state legislation, and has rejected efforts to impose subject matter
constraints on federal spending.224 In particular, the Court has routinely upheld
clearly stated funding conditions that violate no independent constitutional bar, no
matter the amount of funds involved or the tangential relationship a funding
condition may bear to the federal program of which it is part.225 As a result,
provisions such as ACA‘s expansion of the Medicaid rolls or creation of state
health exchanges are based on solid constitutional ground, notwithstanding their
substantial impact on the states, and the same is true of Dodd-Frank and the
Recovery Act.226

Sovereignty‖ Doesn‘t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813 (1998) (explaining that the effect of commandeering
prohibition is to give states leverage in demanding funds).
223. Courts have split over the constitutionality of the ACA‘s individual mandate. Compare
Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 2011 WL 2556039 (No. 10-2388) (6th Cir., June 29, 2011)
(upholding the mandate as within Congress‘s commerce power) and Liberty Univ. Inc. v.
Geithner, 753 F.Supp.2d 611 (W.D. Va. 2010) (same) with Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep‘t of
Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, 2011 WL 285683, at *40-41 (N.D. Fla. Jan.
31, 2011) (holding that Congress exceeded its authority in passing the Act with individual
mandate and thus the entire ACA is unconstitutional); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728
F. Supp. 2d 768, 782, 789-90 (E.D. Va. 2010) (holding individual mandate exceeded Congress‘s
Commerce Clause power but provision was severable from the ACA). Whatever the ultimate
outcome of the individual mandate litigation, however,it seems unlikely to affect the parts of the
ACA with the most direct impact on the states unless the appellate courts sustain the Florida
district court‘s view that the mandate is not severable and its unconstitutionality means that the
entire act must fall. This appears an exceptionally broad approach to severability at odds with
recent Supreme Court precedent. See, e.g., Free Enterp. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 316162 (2010)(holding unconstitutional provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley Act were severable); see also
Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 789-90 (concluding, based on PCAOB, that the mandate should be
severed and its unconstitutionality should not be seen as affecting any other provision of the
ACA).
224. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 10-33 (2005) (deferring to Congress‘s creation of
comprehensive economic regime and rejecting limits based on state law); South Dakota v. Dole,
483 U.S. 203, 205-12 (1987) (emphasizing that determinations of the general welfare are for
Congress and rejecting claim that Congress can only spend money in the areas identified by its
enumerated Article I powers).
225. See Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole: Why the Court Should
Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78
IND. L.J. 459, 464-69 (2003) (―[L]ower courts have had little difficulty upholding a wide range of
funding conditions without a clearly explained relationship to the underlying legislation.‖).
226. See, e.g., Bondi, No. 3:10-CV-91-RV/ENT, 2011 WL 285683, at *3-7 (noting that plaintiffs
did not challenge the Medicaid expansion on the basis of Dole‘s four general spending restrictions
initially and any such challenge would fail); Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health &
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Race to the Top is an especially stark example of the power of spending
conditions and of the difficulty courts face in policing this area of federal-state
relations. The grant amounts at issue were substantial but not astronomical,
totaling $4.35 billion, compared to the $75 billion provided to the states for K-12
education by other provisions of the Recovery Act.227 Yet numerous states
dramatically altered their laws and approach to elementary and secondary
education in the hope of winning a Race to the Top grant. Perhaps this was a
reflection of the economic recession and the profound need states and localities
have for any significant additional education funding. Or perhaps it signals
underlying state interest in many of the educational reforms at issue, with Race to
the Top providing mainly impetus and political cover. Courts are unlikely to be
able to determine which of these scenarios occurred, and more generally to
distinguish instances of coercion from ―hard political choices‖ that states face,
including not wanting to raise taxes to make up for lost federal funds.228
The limited effectiveness of constitutional federalism doctrines does not
mean, of course, that there are no meaningful constraints on federal power. An
important lesson from the Obama Administration initiatives concerns the way that
political and administrative institutional checks that can curb federal overreaching
at the expense of the states. But if judicial constraints are desired, it seems
necessary to look beyond traditional constitutional doctrine—and in particular to
administrative law. I have argued elsewhere that the Supreme Court is using
administrative law as a federalism surrogate, subjecting administrative decisions
affecting state interests to at times searching scrutiny and enforcing even ordinary
administrative law requirements in ways that benefit the states.229 The Obama
Administration measures provide a number of opportunities for courts to employ
administrative law in this fashion to advance federalism concerns. Agency
Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1154 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (dismissing challenge to health
exchanges for failure to state a claim).
227. Total Recovery Act: $787 Billion, ED. WEEK, Jan. 13, 2011, at 12, available at
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2011/01/13/16stimulus.h30.html?tkn=TOSFD%2FyhdRzOwO
OBARDj2Yp1cJj6xRHWPaHa&print=1 (providing a detailed breakdown of Recovery Act
education funds).
228. Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 1989); see Defendants‘ Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiffs‘ Motion for Summary Judgment at 29-30, McCollum, No. 3:10-cv-00091RV/EMT (N.D. Fla. 2010) (noting that Florida, one of the plaintiff states asserting that the
Medicaid expansion was coercive, lacks a state income tax).
229. Metzger, supra note , at 2025-29 (arguing administrative law is the new federalism). Others
have made similar arguments. See William W. Buzbee, Preemption Hard Look Review,
Regulatory Interaction, and the Quest for Stewardship and Intergenerational Equity, 77 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1521 (2009); Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note , 1933-41 (critiquing use of
administrative law in the name of federalism); Sharkey, supra note , at 2180 (commenting upon
hard look and Skidmore review of preemption). For a more skeptical view of administrative
federalism, see Wayne A. Logan, The Adam Walsh Act and the Failed Promise of Administrative
Federalism, 78 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 993 (2010).
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decisions that fail to fully address state concerns or that fail to grant states
sufficient discretion as suggested in the governing statutes could be set aside as
unreasoned and exceeding agency authority. Waiver denials or other
determinations with particular impact on the states, such as decisions to preclude
state enforcement or to have the federal government operate programs in lieu of
the states, could be subject to particularly searching review.230 By thus working
through administrative law, courts may have greater ability to influence how
federal agencies engage and relate to the states and achieve more lasting
protection of state interests than if they approach federal-state relationships
through the limited prism of constitutional federalism.
CONCLUSION
The early years of the Obama Administration were characterized by a
burst of legislative and administrative activity, culminating in the enactment of
several major new national regulatory initiatives. But this expansion of federal
regulation also represented an expansion of state power, as state governments
were granted substantial additional funding and important roles in the new
regulatory regimes. The two key features of these initiatives are their
proregulatory character and the central role of federal agencies in setting the
scope of state authority. As a result, whether states ultimately end up significantly
empowered will depend on particular states‘ interest in playing a greater
regulatory role as well as federal administrative support for substantial state
discretion. What seems clear so far, however, is that federalism under Obama is
federalism in service to progressive policy.

230. See Metzger, supra note , at 2107 (discussing review of waiver denial s).
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